[vc_row][vc_column width=”1/1″][vc_column_text]Inevitably, when deciding which plan of action would be best to employ against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), it will be difficult to isolate recent events from past interventions of the west, within the region. However, to what extent have we learnt from our past lessons? Here are 10 arguments which suggest that air strikes and military intervention should not be pursued by the UK and the west.

Bombing always kills and terrorises civilians.

No matter how careful the intention, bombings – and certainly ground wars – always displace, terrorise and kill civilians. Stop the War Coalition [STWC] has stated: “Recent coalition bombing raids on Raqqa in Syria have brought death and panic to its residents” with one civilian telling western reporters ‘I would not wish them on my worst enemy’.

All three previous British military interventions in the region have been a catastrophe. We risk making the situation worse.

In 2001 we were told that intervention in Afghanistan would dispel the Taliban; 13 years and tens of thousands of deaths later, Afghanistan is a broken nation. Further to this, statistics reveal an increase in the total number of drug users by over 50% to 1.5 million between 2005 and 2010, in addition to a Taliban which is stronger than it ever was.

Fast-forward 10 years into 2011, and a decision was made to intervene in Libya in an effort to prevent a massacre by Gaddafi. As a result, an estimated 30,000 people were killed in a horrifying cycle of violence. The nation is now a failed state without a proper government.

When we examine the current series of conflicts in the region, we see that by intervening against ISIL, there is potential for the coalition to play into Bashar al-Assad’s hands. In spite of the brutality of ISIL, there is arguably more blood on the hands of the Assad regime*. It can be said that he encouraged the growth of ISIL in order to fuel the narrative which he presents to the Syrian people: that being that their choice is between either him, or the fanatics. It is also conceivable that in working to eliminate ISIL in Iraq and Syria, Assad can conserve military power for his other enemies, while we take care of one of his threats.

The occupation of Iraq made way for sectarianism and contributed to the rise of reactionary ISIL.

The foundations of the current turmoil in Iraq can be found largely in our eight year occupation of the country. On top of the trauma of the assault, sectarian division was built into the operation. Elections were organised along communal lines and the authorities used sectarianism to undermine resistance. This fracturing of social cohesion is most evident in Baghdad; by 2006, the ancient city had been transformed from an integrated, modern metropolis into a collection of ruined communal ghettoes. The open discrimination of the Shi’ite Nouri al-Maliki against the Sunni majority agitated a Sunni insurgency last year, which, along with sufficiently hefty funds supplied to the group, helped to fuel the rise of ISIL in Iraq.

The coalition includes Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar.

The recurring theme of ‘complexity’ becomes more evident when this next point is taken into consideration: the coalition includes Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. Immediately one might think that this is positive, as the image of the coalition becomes more legitimate by including regional powers. This may be true, until it becomes apparent that these particular “allies” of the west helped to fund ISIL and other terrorist groups in their infancy**. Moreover, you would be right to question the consistency of a unified allied offensive against the brutality of ISIL when you become aware of the Human Rights Watch report revealing that, in August, nineteen people were beheaded in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, both Qatar and the UAE possess notorious human rights records which include the use of forced labour.

Bombing campaigns give fuel to ISIL’s propaganda.

Bombing raids could potentially increase feelings of hatred towards the west as they give legitimacy to ISIL’s claims that the west is an imperialist force. In cases where the result of interventionist action on civilians in the region is unpredictable, and the motivations of the US and other intervening nations remains questionable, the spread of Islamic militarism accelerates. According to the STWC, 2001 saw comparatively small numbers of militants, mainly located in Pakistan. As of now, militant groups have spread to the middle east, central Asia and parts of Africa.

Cameron is using it as a distraction from his destructive agenda.

A cynic might make the point that the timing of Cameron’s recall to Parliament, added to his subsequent decision to begin another campaign of military action in the region, is questionable. Announced just 2 days prior to the final Tory conference before the election in May, the move could be a strategic way to ward off the threat he actually cares about: Nigel Farage. It also comes at a time when he and his administration are engaged in a destructive, nationalist agenda for party political ends.

It is an expensive mission in a time of crippling (and failing) austerity.

To put it into perspective, a single Tomahawk cruise missile costs £850,000, which is enough to pay the annual salary of 28 NHS nurses. So in effect, each time we fire a missile at ISIL, we lose 28 nurses from our hospitals. In the 2011 bombings of Libya, Britain alone spent between £500 million and £1 billion. This amounts to triple the amount that the Tories have saved by scrapping the disability living allowance.

Is it inevitable that boots on the ground will follow?

Does the decision to intervene signal the beginning of another slippery slope towards boots on the ground? If we take into account the following 2 factors: a) the process leading to military action in the previous two Iraq wars and, b) the role of increasingly vocal commentators – such as Tony Blair and Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb – who are calling for further action, physical intervention seems a reasonable conclusion to make. For slightly more confirmation however, we could examine David Cameron’s recent comments at the Tory conference stating that we will be using “all the assets we have to find these [remaining] hostages”. Seeing as ‘we’ are already using the RAF, does “all the assets” mean that the introduction of ground troops is inevitable?

It makes Britain a target.

A selfish point, but not a minor one. By taking up arms against the militants, we endanger the lives of British servicemen and women, we increase the likelihood of ISIL taking up arms against us domestically, and we increase the chance of British hostages being killed in reaction to our involvement.

Are our attempts futile? Can we really add anything to the campaign?

Although unification in the face of a common enemy is an important message to send to the world, we must ask the following questions: is our contribution going to make much difference to the already intensive efforts of America and it’s Arab partners, particularly in light of how much money could be spent? Have we not learnt from the limitations of our capabilities that were exposed in Libya and in other regional conflicts? Perhaps we should even doubt whether any western involvement is effective – as Robert Colvile puts it plainly for the Telegraph: “We seem to have spent most of the past decade bombing or shooting Islamist militants, and it doesn’t seem to have got us very far. Either they melt away then spring back when we cease fire, or they fail to be deterred”. Furthermore, NATO’s former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Sir Richard Shirreff, dismissed the Government’s approach as ‘a pretty pathetic gesture strategy’.

In conclusion, what the 2011 uprisings of the Arab Spring have shown us is that there is a thirst for democracy, freedom and self-determination by the people in the region. However, in trying to support them in their fight against their respective repressive regimes, we risk enflaming the situation, condemning innocent people to more violence, and inadvertently acting in support of the wrong organisations. Recently, John Prescott expressed that the UK and other western forces should stay out of ISIL’s ‘regional dispute’, and I agree with him. It was unfortunately us who began this mess, arguably as far back as the Sykes-Picot treaty, but it is not up to us to end it.

*[A UN list of the recent war crimes of each side: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/27/how-all-sides-are-committing-war-crimes-in-syria/]

* *[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/kuwait/11077537/How-our-allies-in-Kuwait-and-Qatar-funded-Islamic-State.html].