An interesting change in the British Eurosceptic discourse emerged at Nigel Farage’s public lecture at LSE yesterday (23.01.14). While little must be said about the event itself (yes, Farage is a frighteningly intelligent brilliant public speaker; no, very few of his claims or supporting examples hold up to scrutiny), Farage, unnoticed by many, repeatedly emphasised a remarkable development in UKIP’s strategic focus. According to Farage, the only, and this must be emphasised again, only reason he (and, by implication, UKIP) wants out of the EU, is because of the impossibility to impose restrictions on immigration.

To be fair to Mr Farage, he repeatedly ridiculed the idea of a “United States of Europe” and its supporters, lecturing an outspokenly Europhilic member of the audience on the corruption of “Rumpy Pumpy” and his cronies, and the “fact” that “very, very few people across Europe want a United States of Europe.” Nevertheless, he forfeited the chance to draw connections between membership in the EU and increasing future losses of national sovereignty – immigration control figured as the sole explicitly and implicitly adduced cause for Britain’s need to leave the EU throughout the talk.

This is relevant to the European debate in two striking ways. In a very specific sense, this strategic shift in Farage’s rhetoric represents an earthquake in the European discourse in this country, and in the precedent it sets, throughout Europe: it means that the pro-Europeans, for the first time in recent European Union history, have won the debate on an issue (namely, the economic benefits of ‘staying in’).

While it has become a common pattern that the pro-European side wins the argumentative discussion, it is an equally familiar sight that Eurosceptics have simply ignored this altogether, and relied on pandering to emotion and gut feeling to maintain the public upper hand. Yet, the steady stream of wide-ranging and largely uncontested quantitative (see, inter alia, the recent EEF, LBB, and CBI surveys) and qualitative (see the statements by, inter alia, Nissan, Ford, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Citi Bank, Nestle, Airbus, and BAE Systems) evidence that businesses of all sizes themselves actually want to remain in the EU appears to have overwhelmed Eurosceptic voices by sheer numbers. Given the central role that concerns over suggested economic disadvantages to small businesses, and especially red tape, have played in the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the post-crash years, the fact that the pro-European voice has forced their adversaries into retreat on this issue is monumental.

So far the good news for pro-European campaigners. The bad news, of course, is that no one noticed. In a mild change of tactics, where Euroscpetics previously ignored the fact that to any rational person summing up the arguments, they had lost the debate on an issue, and carried on stoking public fears of those falling victim to tabloid misinformation campaigns, they now appear to prefer quietly moving on. Farage jumping on the immigration-fear bandwagon pays tribute to this. And indeed it works: UKIP’s rise in the polls continues undented (or as Farage gleefully pointed out, “the odds at Paddy Powers are now on uss”), as does the Tories’ gravitational pull to the right.

So is this indeed a ‘tiny earthquake’, interesting for discourse fetishists but with no practical political impact? Certainly not. Visible evidence that the pro-European camp can defeat the Eurosceptics on the argumentative side of things after all is a massive game-changer. This is especially pertinent, given that Farage’s replacement for the Red Tape argument is, of all things, immigration.

Incidentally, Farage made himself quite vulnerable when he pointed out that his preferred model for immigration is the Australian one (no, not the convicts). Allow skilled labour, or rather, those immigrants contributing a net benefit to the host country’s economy, in, and close the gates on the rest. Importantly, he did not advocate no immigration at all, prioritising these economic over cultural arguments against immigration per se. Ironically, immigration may perhaps be an area even better suited to overwhelming populist sentiments with a barrage of empiricism than the economy. Not only is the time ideal post the ridicule (and PCC complaint) the tabloid media brought upon itself with its portrayal of January 1^st as the Bulgaro-Romanian apocalypse (here (and here)); the second half of 2013 also saw a spout of studies into the economic net benefits of migration to the British economy, including evidence that they make a positive net fiscal contribution, and are more likely to be in employment and less likely to be on benefits than British citizens.

Winning the argument on the economic debate sets a precedent. It shows that, unexpectedly to most Europhiles (who tend to be a pretty resigned bunch, and perhaps sometimes stuck in an all too martyrish self-conception), there may be light at the end of the tunnel: with enough pressure and a concerted effort, there is a prospect that they can chase the Eurosceptics, issue by issue, and perhaps slowly but steadily gain an edge in the overall public debate. Deep-core cultural opposition to disintegrating national sovereignty will not be overcome this way. But perhaps pro-European advocates must, for the time being, simply scale down their ambitions, from instilling passion for the ideological and distant abstract concept of a United States of Europe, to merely explaining to people the very real and concrete benefits of membership in the present EU community. Nigel Farage yesterday inadvertently exposed a shimmer of hope for them. Now it is up to Europhiles to step up the chase.