This article is the second in a two-part series on Dave-the-Brave’s EU-speech of Wednesday, 23rd January. Whereas last week I argued that Britain’s relations with the European Union may not be fundamentally affected, this week examines the rather less obvious and rather more dangerous impact on other EU states’ domestic Europe debate.
This resulted in it being treated with anything between quiet approval and tacit acquiescence as-long-as-it-doesn’t-hurt-me. European integration has been done not against the people but, rather neutrally, without the people.
Positions on referenda generally reflect the much deeper philosophical debate on direct versus representative democracy. Amongst those that hold an informed, as opposed to an emotional position (not to say that the two are mutually exclusive) in this debate, there is widespread agreement that in an ideal polity, positing only perfectly informed citizens, direct democracy is both preferable and viable. But given that it is neither rational for most citizens to acquire perfect information due to costs outweighing utility benefits (Anthony Downs), nor at all possible due to cognitive limitations (Herbert Simon), this polity remains a nice little utopia. (And by extension the theory that better-informed citizens are more likely to vote, with all the implications this carries for disproportionate turnout across different socio-economic classes, also renders questionable the conclusion that direct democracy leads to more genuine democracy – also Downs).
Moreover, calls for direct democracy are of questionable constitutional legality in most European countries, where the role or parties in shaping political discourse is similarly constitutionally enshrined as is the exclusive legislative (law-making) power of legislative institutions, i.e. parliaments. This leads to the ironic situation where vociferous defenders of the national state shout for referenda on European issues explicitly to protect against a European technocracy swallowing up their democratic national-constitutional rights – and merely betray their ignorance of the legal complexities constitutions inexorably harbour. The populist twist to this argument fits very well especially with those parties of the centre-to-far right that make gain with nationalism and gravitate more naturally to Euroscepticism – examples are the Austrian FPÖ, the French Front Nationale, the German CSU, Golden Dawn in Greece, the True Finns, and the Czech Conservative Party. Whereas virtually every EU member state possesses one and often multiple Eurosceptic parties, the above are all examples of powerful mainstream parties that are a relevant factor in their countries politics.
By Konstantin Sietzy