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This article is the second in a two-part series on Dave-the-Brave’s EU-speech of Wednesday, 23rd January. Whereas last week I argued that Britain’s relations with the European Union may not be fundamentally affected, this week examines the rather less obvious and rather more dangerous impact on other EU states’ domestic Europe debate.

“DESIRING to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them.” Thus explained the heads of twelve European states the rationale for signing the Maastricht Treaty on 7th February 1992. Yet the ‘single institutional framework’ created on that day is today much less often associated with democracy (let alone, efficiency) than two decades back. Oh by the way: it is commonly known as the European Union.
David Cameron’s portrayal of Europe as an elite project that is “done to the people” elicited the usual condescending, all-out-rejection reflex from continental commentators. Yet the conception of European integration as an elite project is neither novel nor unique; in fact it is more of a historical fact than a political opinion. Historically, integration has a pedigree of occurring without asking the people. Prior to the 2004 TCE referenda in eight member states, popular votes on aspects of European policy were scarce (and have not repeated since). Nor is there any history of indirect votes on European issues through domestic party-political elections: in the words of Simon Hix, Europe’s largest parties actively “collude” to keep European issues off the electoral agenda. In fact, even MEP elections are fought widely on domestic issues. The technical and especially the economic, non-political nature of early European integration (the ECSC, EURATOM, the EEC) lead to a perceived lack of relevance of European-level decisions on citizens’ everyday lives.

This resulted in it being treated with anything between quiet approval and tacit acquiescence as-long-as-it-doesn’t-hurt-me. European integration has been done not against the people but, rather neutrally, without the people.

So what has changed? Present generations of European citizens have been given no less a choice on Europe than their parents and grandparents (namely, no choice). That tacit acquiescence is not a very strong foundation to build upon once people actually perceive some negative impact should always have been clear to European policymakers. Four years of political, economic and social crisis now act as a ‘trigger’ to bring the potential for discomfort to the fore, much rather than fundamentally altering peoples’ positions on European integration.
So what does all of this have to do with DC’s speech, apart from that he got some parts right (if certainly for the wrong reasons)? As described above, Europe’s crisis has caused passive indifference to boil over into active opposition, and a high public awareness of the previously remote, academic challenge of the EU’s ‘democratic deficit.’ A simple problem with a simple remedy, many believe: giving the people a greater say.

Positions on referenda generally reflect the much deeper philosophical debate on direct versus representative democracy. Amongst those that hold an informed, as opposed to an emotional position (not to say that the two are mutually exclusive) in this debate, there is widespread agreement that in an ideal polity, positing only perfectly informed citizens, direct democracy is both preferable and viable. But given that it is neither rational for most citizens to acquire perfect information due to costs outweighing utility benefits (Anthony Downs), nor at all possible due to cognitive limitations (Herbert Simon), this polity remains a nice little utopia. (And by extension the theory that better-informed citizens are more likely to vote, with all the implications this carries for disproportionate turnout across different socio-economic classes, also renders questionable the conclusion that direct democracy leads to more genuine democracy – also Downs).

Elected officials and/or parties derive legitimation from creating information shortcuts: their fulltime job is to peruse various information outlets, acquire, assess and balance a range of facts and opinions, and then present potential voters with a simplified, and bundled, set of policy choices. Thus representative democracy is a necessity in polities with imperfect or asymmetric information to guarantee the very continuation of the democratic political process itself: pure direct democracy would, in our imperfect world, see a miniscule group of voters voting on an infinite number of issues, leading to an utter lack of democracy and to political paralysis.

Moreover, calls for direct democracy are of questionable constitutional legality in most European countries, where the role or parties in shaping political discourse is similarly constitutionally enshrined as is the exclusive legislative (law-making) power of legislative institutions, i.e. parliaments. This leads to the ironic situation where vociferous defenders of the national state shout for referenda on European issues explicitly to protect against a European technocracy swallowing up their democratic national-constitutional rights – and merely betray their ignorance of the legal complexities constitutions inexorably harbour. The populist twist to this argument fits very well especially with those parties of the centre-to-far right that make gain with nationalism and gravitate more naturally to Euroscepticism – examples are the Austrian FPÖ, the French Front Nationale, the German CSU, Golden Dawn in Greece, the True Finns, and the Czech Conservative Party. Whereas virtually every EU member state possesses one and often multiple Eurosceptic parties, the above are all examples of powerful mainstream parties that are a relevant factor in their countries politics.

Concrete calls for referenda have been part of the German CSU (a governing party!) programme for years. More relevantly, in direct response to Cameron’s speech, the Austrian FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) announced its endorsement and made a similar request to vote on Austria’s membership. Significantly, combined with nascent Eurosceptic party Team Stronach (making similar requests), the two poll the support of 30% of the entire Austrian electorate. Italy’s PM Mario Monti (largely owing his post to the EU) has backed Cameron’s approach, and Monday saw a group of Dutch university professors launch a popular initiative lobbying for a Dutch referendum.
Thus David Cameron’s attempt to limit the debate on Europe in his domestic polity may well inflame it in the countries of his European partners. Given consistent cross-party opposition to referenda amongst those parties actually decisive in most European states, the near future is not likely to see a sudden surge in direct popular votes on national policy towards the EU, or membership of the EU itself. What it will certainly see is a further growth of the gap between Europe’s citizens and Europe’s elites, as neither understands and much less even listens to the other side.

By Konstantin Sietzy 



Author

  • Konstatin Sietzy

    Konstantin Sietzy is a third-year Government & History student at LSE, passionate about questions of European identity, citizen participation, and the role of national institutions in the EU. He co-founded and chaired LSESU Politics and Forum’s European Sphere working group and interns for British Influence, the British umbrella campaign to keep Britain in the EU.

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