One thing is as certain to appear on Washington’s calendar as the pardoning of a turkey on Thanksgiving Day: debates on the United States’ commitment to Taiwan. Since shifting recognition of China’s legitimate government from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, US policy on Taiwan has been characterised by extraordinary vagueness. In short, the US acknowledges the “One-China principle”, propagated by the Chinese Communist Party, which maintains that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it. However, the US neither encourages unification nor Taiwanese independence. This complicated position reflects US interest in a peaceful settlement of cross-strait relations that will also uphold the democratic will of Taiwan’s people. Therefore, in addition to supporting Taiwan through arms sales and defence planning, it is possible that Washington will intervene militarily if China attacks the island.

Obvious appeal against commitment to Taiwan

Despite its vagueness, US policy on Taiwan is considerably controversial. There is a majority in both chambers of Congress to stand by Taiwan, not least due to a Taiwan lobby unafraid to use money, charm, and creativity. Still, prominent senators like Dianne Feinstein oppose the arms sales to Taiwan. Some, too, argue that the US should let go on Taiwan to smooth US-China relations and improve chances for compromise on other issues such as the North Korean nuclear programme. The appeal is obvious. As Sino-American relations will play a defining role in world politics for decades to come, removing a source of frequent disagreement, even military confrontation, seems reasonable. However, upon closer examination, the appeal of extending US support to Taiwan becomes much more apparent.

Abandoning Taiwan may not appease China

China treats unification with Taiwan as a core national interest on which it will not consider compromise. If the US simply conceded this, it would open the door for discussions about America’s decline and encourage China to more assertively pursue regional dominance—a dynamic it demonstrated in the 2008 financial crisis. Consider the different interests for a settlement of the dispute. Washington wants a more secure and stable region to safeguard US trade and investment opportunities. Beijing, however, pursues a settlement that is part of a larger effort towards Chinese “national rejuvenation”. Relenting on unification of the motherland, among other core issues, is incompatible with this objective. Conceding on Taiwan may lead to more volatile US-China relations. If leaders in Beijing have an agenda, China could next put pressure on US allies to de-prioritise their relations with Washington or challenge the presence of US forward deployed military such as in Okinawa or South Korea.
On the other hand, if the US is seeking to ease tense relations with China without yielding to Chinese prods towards changing the regional balance of power, the tougher resistance the US would need to exert could likely lead to more expected brinkmanship.

Abandoning Taiwan will alienate US allies in Asia and the world

In the face of Chinese pressures over the Senkaku Islands and militarisation in the South China Sea, maintaining close, trust-based relationships with allies has been vital to the US in protecting shared trade and security interests. Abandoning the long-standing commitment to Taiwan would raise questions as to why the US would not abandon other allies as well, supposedly to improve relations with China.

Think of Taiwan as part of the delicate house of cards that is US alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Removing it will let the house collapse. This is dangerous because subjecting these countries to Chinese pressure risks them having to succumb or engage in perilous security competition with China. Either way, it could pull Washington into more conflict with China and create greater challenges for American troops maintaining open access in the region. Abandoning Taiwan would also have an impact on wider US credibility within and beyond NATO, further undermining international order.

In a worst-case scenario, without US support, Taiwan might declare independence. If this does not trigger an invasion by the Mainland, it would certainly contribute to further destabilise the Asia-Pacific, which is not in anyone’s interest. By opening the door to such radicalisation, and by encouraging China to press harder against the status quo, it poses a greater national security threat than a firm commitment to Taiwan’s security and democracy.

US commitment to Taiwan should become more proactive

So far, the Trump administration is upholding America’s historical commitment by authorising new arms sales, signing the Taiwan Travel Act, which allows US officials on even the most senior levels to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts, and by opening a new complex for the de facto embassy in Taipei. However, it is unlikely that this will balance out against the actions Beijing is taking against Taiwan. Most recently, China seems to have adopted new tactics to force progress on its “one country, two systems” policy. With increasing pro-independence tendencies of President Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), there is evidence to suggest that Beijing has influenced Taiwan’s November 2018 local elections and seeks to sway the 2020 Presidential election in favour of the anti-independence Kuomintang. Looking at the record, China has long used economic pressures and military threats to influence Taiwan’s leaders, and it remains possible that wider-scale election meddling is next on the agenda.

Officials in Taiwan say their people are being fed misleading information in the news and on social media, ranging from unverified footage of threatening drills by the Chinese military to false reports of overseas Taiwanese citizens being abandoned by their government. They also suspect Beijing for illegally funnelling money to political campaigns via Taiwanese businesses on the Mainland. Purportedly, these interferences aim to damage the electorate’s trust in the government and the prospects of an indefinite de facto or eventual de lege independent Taiwan. Taiwan’s democratic development since 1996 has been an important reminder of the possibilities for a free and prosperous Asia. The US has stood by Taiwan’s young democracy since its inception. But now Washington needs to become more proactive if it wants the people of Taiwan to retain their capacity to make a fair and informed decision on unification. Towards this, the US should offer Taiwan sound assistance in combating misinformation and election meddling, as well as seek conversation with Beijing to clarify its intentions. On official terms, all of this maintains observance of the One-China policy.

There are two things the US could do to underline a more serious commitment to this policy. Being more openly optimistic about Taiwan’s defensive capabilities in joint assessments can mend the picture of a vulnerable Taiwan that misinformation campaigns are painting. As a balanced evaluation recently concluded, seizing Taiwan would require the largest, bloodiest, most expensive amphibious operation in history. It is unlikely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could defeat Taiwan’s military in the critical two-week period, even less so after accounting for US support. Secondly, the US should consider making its defence commitment more explicit—this would add necessary confidence for Taiwan’s electorate to make an informed decision. Finally, there is a good chance both of these measures will resonate with a pro-Taiwan Congress.

Based on these observations, US policy on Taiwan can be informed by the following policy recommendations:

1. Clearly communicate enduring commitment to the One-China policy, including non-interference in peaceful cross-strait relations.
2. Raise concern about the risk to Taiwan’s democratic process with President Xi. Emphasise that the US does not hold preference for any Taiwanese government and clarify its commitment to a peaceful, democratically validated settlement of the dispute.
3. Offer current and future Taiwanese governments support for curbing misinformation and election interference. Highlight that the impartiality of this indicates the US is not pursuing any particular agenda.
4. Advise Taiwan’s government against issuing potentially inflammatory pro-independence statements. Point out that even if the US wanted to support an independent Taiwan, it cannot do so in the current climate. Clarifying limits to US support will reduce uncertainty for Beijing and Taipei and deter each from risky action.
5. Adopt an optimistic tone about the strength of Taiwan’s defence. Highlighting objective evaluations can help deter a potential attack from the Mainland and remedy unfounded pessimism and instability within Taiwan.
6. In addition to continued arms sales and coordination between senior defence officials, consider making the US security commitment to Taiwan explicit. This would give Taiwan’s electorate necessary confidence to make a balanced decision for its future.