Author: Andreas Tsamados

This is the start of a new era. An era of nuclear power in which the human race had attained the intelligence necessary to destroy itself, but not the moral maturity to avoid seeking and weaponising this terrifying ability.

Seventy years ago, on the 6th of August at 8:15 a.m., the U.S. dropped the world’s first atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. Total annihilation followed in the wake of the explosion; the blast itself and the resulting nuclear radiation took the lives of 140,000 innocent civilians. Three days later, the citizens of Nagasaki became the victims of the second atomic bomb, with another 74.000 losing their lives. As the world commiserates over the tragedy, the Hibakusha (survivors of the atomic bomb), carry on. Kenzaburo Oe wrote, “the only gift that the world has received from these bombings… [is] the wisdom of their survivors”. The “wisdom” itself can be summed up as follows:

Never again should a population endure such inhuman destruction.

Only four years after the bombings, on the 29th of August 1949 the world abandoned its hopes of avoiding the scale of this destruction again. This date marks the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test, code-named “RDS-1” and the start of a new era – the era of nuclear power – in which the human race had attained the intelligence necessary to destroy itself, but not the moral maturity to avoid seeking and weaponising this terrifying ability. Whether one believes that nuclear weapons can be used to deter wars or to mitigate seemingly intractable problems is irrelevant to the logic of the following paragraphs. Waltz’s laissez-faire attitude regarding nuclear proliferation or Mearsheimer’s idea of “selectiveness” encompasses most of the arguments advocating the necessity for the existence of these weapons. Yet, they cast aside the very real possibility of “accidents” and “irrational actions”.

Journalist Eric Schlosser’s book ‘Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety’ depicts numerous “close calls” that have filled the past 70 years and have brought the world perilously close to full-blown nuclear war. Many of these accidents could be described in the exact same words employed by Kennedy’s adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, when he deemed the Cuban missile crisis to constitute “the most dangerous moment in history”. The Black Brant scare in January 1995 is representative of these fears and is proof of the continuing threat posed by nuclear arms regardless of whether international order is bipolar or multipolar. The Black Brant XII missile launched from Norway to study the Aurora Borealis streaked its way past Russian airspace, and was mistaken for a U.S. Navy submarine-launched Trident Missile. As a result, Russian nuclear forces were put on high alert, fearing a high-altitude nuclear attack that could blind Russian radars. Cheget – the nuclear weapons command suitcase – was given to Russian president Boris Yeltsin. He had five minutes to decide whether or not to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike.

General Lee Butler, the former commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, the body which controls nuclear weapons and strategy for the US, has described the survival of humanity up to now as “some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion”. Surely, since General Butler’s condemnation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and automated response systems in general, these have now been remodelled. However, basic problems in the nuclear arms administration persist. In 2016, the decision to destroy the world is still left to the president or prime minister, for a majority of states, within a tight timeframe. Just as in the past, fail-safe and safety systems remain imperfect; the standards set worldwide for the preservation or movement of nuclear bombs are not necessarily met, leaving a terrifying uncertainty with data and human error.

Ultimately, there are inherent problems with having nuclear weapons, mainly being that they are handled by fragile beings, affected by a mind-numbing compression from imminent threat and subject to blinding emotions. Adding to the mix factors like regional instability, historical vindictiveness, and suppressed national pride, it is indeed hard to conceive that leaders will always make the right decision. Events similar to the 1995 incidents are bound to occur; their denouement however might not be as fortunate. In addition, as the number of countries possessing nuclear armament increases we can only assume that the probability of accidents occurring will too. These simple facts constitute, in my opinion, a sufficient basis for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. This distant dream can be attained; it only takes everyone’s agreement. Political realities and national interests around the globe do collide in some part with this conclusion. However, the necessary sacrifice in order to disarm nuclear weapons is insignificant in comparison to the one the world would have to make in the instance of a nuclear war. Technology cannot be reverted, losing the capacity to make nuclear weapons is impossible, but it can be relinquished. Nuclear bombs can be disarmed and we have a responsibility to do it.

Sources:

Schlosser, E. (2013) Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. Penguin Press.

Chomsky, N. (2014) As Hiroshima Day dawns, why are we still tempting nuclear fate?

General Butler Lee’s review. [Online] Available from: http://chomsky.info/interviews/20140405.htm