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If 2016 was the populist party, 2017 was the hangover. There was much too much noise with the executive orders, press conferences, and tweets. The “fake news” and “alternative facts” of partisan politics were spinning all around us and left us spinning too. And as the year of the Muslim ban, worst mass shooting in American history, hottest average temperatures and more came to an end, most of us were feeling sick. This is the scene that Peter Trubowitz, Head of LSE’s International Relations department and Director of the US Centre, must explain to TV audiences each week.

For the past three years, Professor Trubowitz has appeared on American and British news stations to provide historical context to the latest stories and offer academic perspective on the breaking news. It is not an easy job to rise above the “fire, fire media frenzy” as he calls it, but he has assumed this role as a professor, an author, and an engaged American citizen. I spoke with Professor Trubowitz to get some of that context and perspective on the Russia investigation, “America First,” the US-China relationship, and more.

Professor Peter Trubowitz, Head of LSE’s International Relations Department – CNN

SP: I’d like to get started on the hottest news of last couple of weeks, the Mueller indictments. The Justice Department has charged 13 Russians in an indictment that detailed an information warfare campaign during the 2016 election. As big as the story was, it didn’t charge or name President Trump or anyone in his immediate circle. Where do you think this probe is going?

PT: I think it’s a very significant development for a number of reasons. First, it is backed up at a level of detail that people very close to Donald Trump within the administration, like McMaster (Trump’s National Security Advisor), have said is incontrovertible. So it’s significant in that it supports what the intelligence agencies have been saying for some time, that in fact there was Russian penetration of the election and that it affected the election in different ways, even if it is not clear what the actual impact on the outcome was. Second, Mueller demonstrated that in fact it is possible to keep a secret in Washington. This says something about the integrity of his operation and its level of professionalisation— and it pushes back against what you sometimes hear from Trump and Trump’s allies. The last thing is how disquieting and troubling Donald Trump’s response to this has been. This is a major intervention into American political life, and the role of the president, the commander-in-chief, is to do something about it. This could easily happen again in the United States, it could happen in other countries — it is happening in other countries. So this is an assault on American institutions that needs to be confronted.

With Trump’s refusal so far to respond to these issues, how concerned are you about Russian interference in the 2018 midterms?

I think we should assume that there will be attempts and that presumably they’ve gotten better at what they’re doing. And that said, I think it underscores the need for the United States to have a much more robust system than it currently does. I think the midterms will turn on many other things, but it’s not inconceivable that we will see continued efforts by Russians and by others to penetrate the system.

The lack of a robust system is very apparent right now and it’s certainly problematic that our foreign policy is reflecting our partisanship. But hasn’t this been the case continuously since the end of the Cold War? How much of this is a crisis of Trump?

If you look at the last quarter of the century, I would say the United States hasn’t had a consistent grand strategy where it’s pursuing an overarching theme like the containment of or balancing against the Soviet Union. There’s been much more play in the system partly because the United States has much more latitude internationally than it did during the Cold War— much more kind of geopolitical slack. This was true of Bill Clinton, of George W Bush, of Barack Obama, and it’s true of Donald Trump. At the same time, what has happened is the United States has grown increasingly polarized, which makes it harder for the United States to act in a coherent, consistent, and programmatic way in the area of foreign policy. One has to be careful about the “golden age” during the Cold War— bipartisanship can lead to disaster as it did in Vietnam. It’s not a guarantee for sound and wise policy. Having said that, it has been very difficult for the post-Cold War presidents to mobilise domestic consent over foreign policy, which has fueled doubts about the credibility of American commitments and America’s willingness to lead.

what has happened is the United States has grown increasingly polarized, which makes it harder for the United States to act in a coherent, consistent, and programmatic way in the area of foreign policy

With Trump, I think there’s a great deal of concern internationally that the United States is actually in retreat. As Evan Osnos put it in a great New Yorker piece back in early January, if Obama was leading from behind, Trump is retreating from the front. While the Trump administration has doubled down on certain things like Obama’s strategy for fighting ISIS – and with some success – in other areas, it is focusing much more on the domestic rather than the international politics.

And is that what “America First” means? A retreat from the front towards domestic issues?

I think that’s what it has become in practice. “America First” was a phrase that spoke to the anger, the bitterness, and the resentment that exists in the United States— about the heavy commitment to globalization that started with Clinton, that was continued under Bush, and that was sustained by Obama. It spoke to the feeling that too many Americans have lost their jobs as a result of this unfettered internationalism. “America First” was Trump’s way of signalling to people that I’m going to put you first. And I think that resonated with a sufficient number of voters to put him over the top, especially in key industrial states in the United States where there is a perception that they have been hurt by the outsourcing of jobs, by trade, and by open immigration.

Trump spoke to the question, but what has he delivered for those people? Does the tax cut really speak to that problem for those people? He’s pulled out of TPP, he’s scuttled American participation in TTIP, and it’s a little unclear where NAFTA’s going right now. And we’ll know within a month whether or not he slaps serious tariffs on aluminum and steel and other things (which Trump has now done).

There was a piece that you wrote just before the inauguration that talked about America First as a potentially anti-Chinese agenda. What might happen in the policy dimension of the US-China relationship?    

I think the relationship could really deteriorate. China is not an “economic pygmy” as I put in that piece — it can push back. And I think its own leadership may feel compelled to do that, to not just be at the receiving end. The nature of the US-China relationship is very dependent upon domestic politics in both countries, more than I think people appreciate. This is not to say that what’s happening in North Korea doesn’t matter to the relationship, it does greatly, but the domestic dynamics on both sides matter too. So as we head towards the 2018 midterms, I would expect that the administration’s rhetoric about China — that China’s getting a free lunch, that it’s taking advantage of the United States — I would expect that to increase.

And how might this play out? As a series of rhetorical blows? A trade war? A real confrontation in the South China Sea?

I wouldn’t rule out anything. There’s always room for miscalculation. Neither side could possibly want to be trading physical blows in the South China Sea or over North Korea, but as the twentieth century and World War I demonstrated, events can drag you into something that you don’t really want. We have an environment where US-Chinese relations are deteriorating, where third parties have their own agendas and incentives, and where things may escalate. This can create conditions that make it difficult for the major players to work together to avoid getting sucked into something. In the first instance it is rhetoric, but as parties dig in they reduce the political room that they have to manoeuvre. It makes it very difficult to do anything that doesn’t look like a retreat.

And the US-China relationship matters beyond the bilateral relationship. There’s also a question of global hegemony — whose world is it? Some people are describing the present moment as a passing of the baton from the United States to China. Others talk about a leaderless, “G-Zero” world. How do you think that the international order is being defined right now with respect to the US and China?

I still think that a lot of the world is looking to the United States for leadership and they’re not getting it — and they’re worried about it. It’s not completely obvious that China is prepared to pick up the slack at least in terms of how the United States has defined leadership, with international institutions and multilateralism and so forth. But my main concern about the United States in retreat is the introduction of a lot of uncertainty into the international system.

We have an environment where US-Chinese relations are deteriorating, where third parties have their own agendas and incentives, and where things may escalate
It has created incentives for countries to do more to take matters into their own hands. And at one level that’s fine and that’s good. But it can fuel tension in regions. For example, to the extent that the United States is seen as withdrawing from Asia (as a result of pulling out of TPP), there is a lot more pressure on the Japanese to do more. And that’s being coded and read in Beijing in a way that’s not necessarily favourable.

I have to end on the not-so-cheery question of nuclear war. Standing above all the problems of populism, of democracy, and of the international order is the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. How is the Trump administration handling this issue, and what do you think we have in store?

I think it’s a serious problem and a great risk, and I worry that 2018 will be tenser than 2017. It’s not difficult to imagine scenarios where North Korea has a missile test that the United States shoots down or tries to, and where this thing could escalate. I think it’s good that there’s some talking going on right now (potentially even a meeting between Trump and Kim later this year). But I think what we’ve seen on both sides, on the North Korean side and on the US side, is a hardening of positions. And I think that this is an area where Trump’s behaviour suggests that he views the North Koreans as a challenge — not just a challenge to America’s strategic interests, but a personal challenge given the nature of some of these responses. So I worry about it. I don’t think we should be complacent at all.

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