A Debate for our Time:

The election of Donald Trump indicates a foreign policy shift in the most powerful country in the world; the latest in a series of dramatic changes to the international sphere during the 21^st Century.

Most experts would accept that the unipolar world is coming to an end; America is no longer the unchallenged superpower.

The question of Russia will loom large on the priorities of governments and policy advisors across Europe, America and the Middle East for the foreseeable near future.

Recent Russian foreign policy can be summed up as revisionism. They seek to overturn the post-Cold War order. They seek to redress Russia’s relegation from the position of a super-power and to re-establish a Russian ‘sphere of influence.’

This policy has manifested itself militarily in the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent support for separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk, and military intervention in Syria.

Russian defence policy also states that the information domain is one of war.  They have broadcast propaganda through institutions like Russia Today combined with cyber attacks, as demonstrated in the hacking of the DNC and Clinton’s private emails during the US election, to undermine public trust in governments that might threaten Russia and to weaken NATO.

MI5 head, Andrew Parker, recently argued that an increasingly aggressive Russia poses a growing threat to the UK. “It is using a whole range of state organs and powers to push its foreign policy abroad in increasingly aggressive ways-involving propaganda, espionage, subversion and cyber-attacks.”

How should the West respond to Russian revisionism? This article will present three contrasting positions that the West, as a collective, should follow as a response. This debate aims to illustrate the difficulties and disagreements surrounding foreign policy decision-making.

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War and Peace:

World War Three?

Whilst Russia is certainly revisionist Putin is almost certainly not aiming to resuscitate the Soviet Empire. Russia has a GDP that is a similar size to Australia and as such can have no realistic hope of re-establishing Soviet power.

We need have no fear of a major war engulfing Europe if we give way to Putin in the same way that appeasing Hitler did in the build up to WWII.

Putin is seeking minimal changes that will ensure Russia’s position as a respected geopolitical player and to reverse Western encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence.

Western Arrogance:

Russia has legitimate grievances against the West. We have made fundamental errors that have humiliated Russia, showed Russia that the West operates to double standards and indicated that the West has designs to undermine their regime.

The expansion of NATO ever eastward after the Cold War, despite “the generally accepted spirit of the 1990 negotiations”, which implied that there would be no further expansion, was seen as both a threat and a humiliation to Russia. This dismissal of Russian interests was taken to its highest point by implying that Ukraine and Georgia would become members in 2008. Ukraine holds a key cultural significance as homeland of the Kievan Rus, and also a geopolitical significance that determines whether Russia is a cross-continental or purely Asian power. Russia’s response to the Ukrainian coup was no more extreme than could be expected from the USA if Justin Trudeau had been overthrown and a pro-Russian regime erected in his place.

The West laid the foundations for the demoting of the importance of territorial sovereignty in the recognition of Kosovan independence in 2008, despite assurances to Russia that the West valued Serbian sovereignty. At the time Putin said “this is double ended stick and the other end will come back and hit you in the face” and his conduct in the Ukraine has brought his words home.

The West again showed that their word could not be trusted when Russia acquiesced to the NATO air campaign in Libya on the understanding that Gadhafi would not be toppled from power. The removal of Gaddafi raised fears about the West’s enthusiasm for regime change, which made Putin worry for his own stability.

The concert of powers:

If the West works to calm tensions with Russia it would not only end the potential conflict but also enable them to work together to help bring peace to a turbulent world.

As was seen during the American invasion of Afghanistan, Russian co-operation could be a crucial weapon for the West in its on-going battle with terrorism. The failed Syrian truce deal in September presented an opportunity for a concert of great powers that could have potentially worked to calm the Syrian conflict. As Amitai Etzioni has argued, the West’s stance on Syrian negotiations: that Assad must step down immediately before negotiations even start has actively discouraged Assad from stopping fighting. The influence of Russia over Assad means that Russia will need to play the key role in any future negotiations.

Furthermore, Russian co-operation is crucial on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and material. Recent tensions between the US and Russia, worsened by a confrontational Western attitude, has led to Russia pulling out of the Nuclear Security Pact. Russian assistance was vital in the success of the Iran deal; by promising to provide all necessary power they effectively removed Iran’s rationale for needing a large domestic enrichment capability.

Peace:

In order to avert war and to reduce Moscow’s information warfare we must address the causes of Russian fear and aggression.

Whilst I would not go so far as to suggest a roll-back of the over-extension of NATO, as this would only encourage Russian annexation of the Baltic states, there are less extreme steps that would show that the West respects Russian sphere of influence. The West should publicly rule out NATO’s further expansion.

The West should also recognise Russian control over Crimea as a genuine expression of the rights of self-determination, similar to how we recognised Kosovan independence. Khrushchev gave Crimea to the Ukraine as a self-interested political move in 1954. This decision cannot be considered more binding or legitimate than 82.8% of Crimeans voting for reunification, or the continued polls that say that the vast majority of Crimeans are still in favour of Russian rule. The West should encourage Ukraine to enact on its commitments in Minsk II and enact constitutional reform to allow for greater regional autonomy. This should be combined with a steady role-back of sanctions in line with Russian withdrawal from Eastern Ukraine. By combining recognition of Russian interests with a firm statement that NATO will not be going anywhere we provide assurance of security for both Russia and the surrounding states.

The West should re-admit Russia into the G8 as a sign that we value their role as a global actor and disarm Putin’s dangerous “siege” narrative. This should be combined with a relaxation of “Russia bashing” from leading European and American politicians.

Instead there should be an attempt to embrace Russia as a member of the European community and thus make our relationship more open, interdependent and predictable. The EU should offer the incentives of Most-Favoured Nation trading status and offer visa-free travel to Russians, as they have done for Turks and Ukrainians, as rewards for Russia reducing its military and propaganda aggressions against the West. We should increase the number of scholarships and exchange programmes with Russian universities in order to increase understanding.

Russia has legitimate grievances against Western incursions into their traditional sphere of influence, a clear indication that the West takes this and the Russian’s geopolitical position seriously would dramatically reduce tensions. Secondly, by showing that working with the West brings more economic and political benefits than conflict does we could start a new era of Russian and Western co-operation.

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The Defence:

The X Article

In 1947 the US Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, wrote a widely referenced anonymous article in Foreign Affairs advocating “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Nearly 70 years later, the broad tenets of this foreign policy approach towards Russia are as necessary as ever.

Under Putin, a national ideology has been reinvented for the twenty-first century. Tight government control of the media has allowed Putin to combine Anti-American sentiment, Orthodox-based exceptionalism and nostalgia for the lost global clout of the Soviet Union and the Tsarist age. The re-alliance of throne and altar plays a legitimating role for a revisionist foreign policy that harnesses the historic Messianic dimension of Russian Orthodoxy.

Besides a liberal interlude in the experimental early 1990s, Realpolitik has been the dominant mode in the Kremlin, arguably, going back to Tsarist times. “Probe with bayonets. If you encounter steel, withdraw. If you encounter mush, continue,” so runs Lenin’s famous Russian axiom. This Soviet logic of probing and feeling-out of an opposition’s coherence and capabilities continues to be the received wisdom of the current Russian presidential administration. Russian revisionism manifests itself in different forms: militarily in Ukraine and Syria, in the information space through psychological and cyber attacks, and diplomatically by contesting the status quo in global institutions. It is clear, therefore, that the cooperative, concessionary approach of Obama’s symbolic Reset in 2009 failed resoundingly. However, confrontation with an antagonistic, nuclear power, possessing a high-degree of military readiness, is equally unacceptable.

A high-profile Russian military modernisation programme, announced in 2011, is investing 20.7tn roubles ($317bn at current rates) over the course of a decade with the purpose of modernising up to 70% of Russian military technology and weapon systems by 2020. Although the rouble has halved in value against the dollar since 2011, the Russian military has already improved qualitatively since displaying systemic problems during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. The West should sit up and take note of Russia’s ability to conduct slick, asymmetrical operations in Ukraine. Moreover, the Syrian Crisis has been cynically used to demonstrate to a global audience that Russian can project force beyond its traditional ‘sphere of privileged interest.’

What is to be done?

1. Military containment: Approach the situation with a realist lens; ensure that areas of weakness in the Baltic, especially the 60km Suwalki gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad, are reinforced with a credible military contingent. The success of containment requires that the cost-benefit calculus for Russia be altered to make costs of adventurism unacceptable. Recent history in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria has set a dangerous precedent, teaching the Russian foreign-policy elite that offensive military operations are unlikely to have serious repercussions. NATO has been revived as a security institution in the face of Russian military resurgence. It’s continued success depends on fulfilment of mutual obligations on both sides of the Atlantic. European NATO partners must uphold their side of the collective security bargain, making the case to their electorates for beefed-up defence budgets coordinating with partners to develop strategic capabilities. Trump administration must avoid making isolationist signals that may encourage Putin to continue the subversive, asymmetric approach to the Russian near-abroad, fomenting frozen conflicts.

2. Economic containment: Insist on implementation of Minsk II and ensure solidarity on sanctions against Russia with the assurance of their removal upon fulfilment.

3. Informational containment: The Russian conception of warfare goes beyond the military to the informational-psychological, using instruments of disinformation, emotional manipulation and misinformation to stoke fatalism or sympathies. Containment in the twenty-first century against information warfare requires engagement of Russian-speaking populations in Eastern European countries. One constructive step to containing expansionist Russian psychological warfare would be for the West to support Russian language broadcasting in the Baltics to promote pluralism in the information space.

Speak softly and carry a big stick

Ultimately, with an economy currently the size of Australia’s, Putin cannot afford a Great Power war in the Baltics, which makes containment the natural policy. Beyond the bluster is a desire for prestige and a global role, which Russia assumes by taking on the role of America’s chief antagonist. Russia must be treated with the respect she deserves but her foreign policy objectives must be reviewed critically and checked tenaciously. With regard to the President-elect’s dovish Russia policy advanced during the election campaign, Trump would be wise to learn from his predecessor, Teddy Roosevelt, “speak softly and carry a big stick.”

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Crimea and Punishment:

The symbolism of a Russian aircraft carrier sailing through the English Channel, on its way to reap destruction in Syria, cannot be ignored. European opposition to this flotilla was understated; the Royal Navy, suffering severe cutbacks, offered only a paltry challenge to this force and NATO found it necessary to convince the Spanish to refuse a request by this fleet to refuel. The passage of these Russian warships reiterated the same, sharp message Vladimir Putin has been touting for nearly a decade: the rules of ‘the game’ have changed.

We must recognise that it is our complacency that has led us to this juncture. We watched from the sidelines as Putin’s Russia intervened in both Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), notwithstanding the striking parallels between its armed acquisition of the Crimea and Hitler’s seizure of the Sudetenland (yes, I went there). Putin’s barefaced backing of proxies in Eastern Ukraine, which led to the destruction of an airliner and the loss of 298 lives, earned only a slap on the wrist. Fearful of irritating our gas-supplying neighbour to the east, we have ignored Russia’s targeting of European countries’ cyber infrastructure. To our shame, we have turned our backs on Aleppo’s populace; soon to be terrorised by the very aircraft we have afforded safe passage. We have not done enough to challenge Putin’s game-changing violations.

Russia may hold real grievances against the West – NATO and the EU’s inexorable expansion into Eastern Europe was certainly ill advised – but, instead of meaningful dialogue, the country’s leadership fomented rabid populism and rallied Russia’s antiquated and conscript manned military. Sanctions and feeble words failed to halt the revisionist aspirations of Mussolini’s Italy and Hirohito’s Japan. Why is Putin’s Russia the exception? The time has come: we need to drive a distinct, forceful message back to Putin and his ilk.

This message should feature carefully calibrated economic, political, and military components; designed to demonstrate solidarity and resolve. Putin’s elite patronage system is his Achilles heel. When NATO forces bombed Serbia in 1999, it targeted the hotels, casinos, and businesses of Slobodan Milosevic’s elite, causing these actors to pressure him to make peace. I certainly do not advocate direct military action, but shutting Russia out of the Swift interbank payments system could have a similar effect. When the dear children of Moscow’s oligarchs are blocked from transferring money from their German bank accounts to fund a bottle of Goût de Diamants at the Siberia Club, you can be sure the Kremlin will hear about it.

The West shouldn’t be afraid to use its soft power to target Putin’s prestige and damage Russia’s standing in domestic and international circles. In 1980, the US, Canada, W. Germany, Norway, and others boycotted the Moscow Olympic games to protest the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Russia’s hosting of the 2018 World Cup offers a similar opportunity for European states to unite and shun this event. Given the lengths that he has gone to fix Russia’s hosting of the Cup and the costs that the country’s putrefying economy will undergo for the privilege, losing the participation of Europe’s star-studded teams would hit Putin where it hurts – his precious ego.

Removing the anonymity of Putin’s gang could land a serious blow to his regime. The faces and personal histories of a shadowy Chinese cyberwarfare unit were uncovered in 2014, causing embarrassment to China’s government. Broadcasting the sordid details of Russia’s elites for the global public could force these individuals to think twice before acquiescing to Putin’s schemes; that’s if they still want to easily visit relatives in New York or vacation in Courchevel 1850. Russia’s top tycoons, senior bureaucrats, pro-regime lawyers, and military brass should be investigated and their personal histories presented in all their ugliness to both the officers of the West’s visa departments and our breakfast tables. The message? You can’t hide.

Putin doesn’t think that NATO and the EU have the will to confront him. He’s right. Solidarity and shared responsibility are the keys to challenging Putin and Russia. It’s high time that all of NATO’s members actively contributed the required 2% of their GDP to the collective budget of the Atlantic alliance. Or, in the event that Donald Trump damages the alliance beyond repair, the EU needs to arm itself. Western resistance begins on a combined balance sheet and with the resolve to shoulder collective burdens.

Despite Russia’s growing poverty, its military probes European and North American border regions, airspace, and territorial waters. These intrusions must be confronted with the only language that Putin understands: an overwhelming show of force. Western navies and air forces should ratchet up harassment and show no respite to its Russian counterparts. NATO or the EU should increase and mirror Russian land exercises in our border regions, allowing Western signals officers to document Russian transmissions and drills. If Putin wants a ‘Fortress Russia’ he can have it, but make him cognizant that sallying forth won’t be easy, cheap, or smart.

Russia’s cyberwarfare capabilities to fabricate truths and infiltrate both the political processes and the hearts and minds of Western publics are well known and must be confronted. Balancing Russian-language online and traditional news platforms with open and free sources of information, funded by European states and the US, could decrease Russia’s penetration into Europe. Multinational cyberwarfare games, targeting a fictional adversary’s assets, should be carefully increased so as to demonstrate resolve and ability, without damaging Russia’s confidence in its strategic defence systems, i.e. its nuclear weapons.

I am well aware that Trump’s election to office of the President of the United States and Britain’s vote to leave the EU has damaged the standing of these two countries and could affect their determination to act. Nevertheless, NATO and/or the EU should rebuild their capabilities, share responsibility, and confront Russia with whatever tools they have to hand. It’s time to learn from history and send a defiant message to Putin’s Russia: changing the rules will cost you dearly.

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“All we can know is that we know nothing” (Tolstoy):

It is not our intention to tell the reader which one of these suggestions is the correct one. We merely encourage the reader to acknowledge the difficulties and complexities involved with foreign policy decisions and the way that individual decisions have to tie into a broader strategy. We also hope to point out that various stances on issues all have merit and that we should try to consider a wide variety of opinions from different sources and ideological positions in order to form a more holistic view.