Following a divided and dramatic election, Jair Bolsonaro, a former army captain and long-serving right-wing congressman, assumed office on 1 January as Brazil’s next president. To critics, his victory signals the end of Brazilian democracy. They see a return to the former days of military dictatorship – a crackdown on social liberties, freedom of speech and the opposition. To his many supporters however, Bolsonaro’s lack of political correctness is either admired or seen as a fair price to pay for his promise to end the gruelling violence that has haunted Brazil for decades. Having narrowly missed an outright win in the country’s first round of elections, Bolsonaro has become the latest right-wing politician to be elected in the current wave sweeping conservatives to power across South America.

To the satisfaction of political analysts, Bolsonaro’s 27-year tenure in Congress provides some useful indicators for forecasting what his mandate could entail. This article will examine the crucial future changes in policy we could see during the Bolsonaro administration including pension reform, a withdrawal from Mercosur and a curb on social rights.

Political power, the cabinet and federalism

Partido Social Liberal (PSL), Bolsonaro’s party, is currently a minority in Congress, which limits the president’s policy-making power for policies which require legislative approval and his ability to pass constitutional changes. Although PSL may be able to lobby centrist or right-wing parties to create a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, it is unlikely that a coalition will be formed in Senate, where Bolsonaro faces his most significant opposition: Partido de los Trabajadores (PT) or the Workers’ Party. The PT is the political home of Bolsonaro’s predecessors, Dilma Rousseff and Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, both of whom have been linked to the colossal money laundering scheme known as Operation Car Wash. Lula da Silva, who governed Brazil from 2003-2011, is currently serving time in prison for money laundering, influence peddling and obstruction of justice. Although Lula Da Silva was a strong initial contender against Bolsonaro, he was prohibited from running in the 2018 election due to his imprisonment, which largely benefited Bolsonaro’s campaign.

Bolsonaro’s cabinet is comprised of a small clique of generals and technocrats some of whom are little-known and controversial characters such as the climate change-denier Ernesto Araújo, who will become Foreign minister. Nonetheless, Brazil is a highly decentralised federation where states and municipalities enjoy high levels of political and fiscal autonomy, which may limit the influence of Bolsonaro’s policies.

Economy, taxes and Mercosur

Bolsonaro’s mandate ought to support the country’s slow recovery from its deepest-ever recession which began in 2014. In 2017 the unemployment rate stood at 12% and the government deficit remains over 7% of Brazil’s GDP.

Bolsonaro has openly admitted that he has no understanding of the economic dynamics of his country and will rely on Paulo Guedes, his star economic advisor. Guedes is a fierce advocate of economic liberalism and his plan focuses on pension reform, which is sorely needed given that Brazil’s pension system accounts for more than 8% of the country’s GDP,. The cost of the pension system is the biggest driver of deficit in the economy, enhanced by Brazil’s ageing population.

Guedes has also supported the privatisation of Brazil’s staple state firms such as Petrobras, Electrobras and Banco do Brasil, though this has been a point of contestation between him and Bolsonaro. Tax cuts for companies and the simplification of the tax code have been discussed as policies to stimulate private investment and job creation.

A preference for bilateral trade relations has also been expressed by both Guedes and Bolsonaro, which raises the question of whether Brazil’s membership in Mercosur is to last much longer. The South American trade bloc has been criticised by both men as restrictive and not a priority in the mandatary’s agenda, though they have ensured that trade with member-states will continue.

Crime and social policies

Bolsonaro’s political success has  in large part been due to his firm pledge to crack down on crime. At a record high, 63,880 people were murdered across the country in 2017. The president has claimed that he will make it easier for individuals to bear arms and will empower the police force to use harsher tactics against criminals, including lethal force. His political rhetoric has often praised the military dictatorship Brazil endured from 1964 to 1985, claiming that more people should have been killed instead of tortured during this time.

In terms of tackling poverty, Bolsonaro has promised to uphold and even increase funding for Bolsa Familia, a conditional cash-transfer system introduced by Lula da Silva which is held as the gold standard in the world of welfare politics. The social welfare programme consists of granting underprivileged families with a monthly stipend in exchange for parents sending their children to school and doctor appointments. The president’s show of support came as a surprise for most people, given the left-wing origin of the programme. Bolsonaro’s agenda is largely based on a conservative and austere model of governance, which would entail welfare retrenchment, making support for Bolsa Familia an unexpected move.

Although no claims have been made in regards to what social policies will characterise a Bolsonaro mandate, his inflammatory comments towards women, LGBT and Afro-Brazilian communities have been indications that Bolsonaro’s agenda will be socially conservative. Homophobic violence in Brazil reached record levels in 2017, with 445 deaths registered as hate crimes, enhancing fears of persecution within the LGBT community under a Bolsonaro government. Alessio Ribeiro Suoto, the prime candidate for Education Minister, has expressed intentions to reform school curricula to battle “toxic ideologies” in the educational system, which he considers threaten the traditional structure of the family.

Environment and energy production

Bolsonaro has pledged to combine the environment ministry with the agriculture ministry and to appoint a representative of agribusiness in the new combined ministry – a move that suggests he sympathises with the interests of the agribusiness sector. He has accused environmental agencies of unfairly fining companies and has argued for the simplification of the process to acquire environmental licenses for development projects. Although the president has announced that he will not withdraw Brazil from the Paris Climate Agreement, environmentalists are still alarmed by the prospect of him building hydroelectric dams in the Amazon. Such dams would lead to deforestation, environmental degradation and the displacement of indigenous communities.

Tension has therefore risen between Bolsonaro and indigenous groups as the president has claimed that no new indigenous reserves will be demarcated and existing reserves will be considered for mining projects. This has raised debates throughout Brazil about the president’s lack of respect for indigenous territorial sovereignty.

Only two things can be certain with regards to what  Bolsonaro’s Brazil will look like: firstly, that polarising times are ahead with an outspoken civilian opposition determined to hold the new government accountable for its every move. Secondly, it can be expected that Bolsonaro will try to fulfil his promise of reducing crime and corruption, although through measures unseen in Brazil since the dictatorship. Elements of Bolsonaro’s victory echo Hugo Chávez’s in 1999, particularly in the lack of credibility of the political opposition. Whether Bolsonaro’s mandate will result in much needed change, or in the rather more common unfortunate outcome of stagnation that other Latin American democracies have seen in recent years, only time can tell.