This article is the first in a two-part series analysing the impact of Cameron’s January 23rd speech. This week predicts a much more diluted impact on Britain-EU relations that may be expected. Part II will look at how the PM’s decision to permit a referendum nevertheless has substantial, unexpected, and decisively destabilising impact on the domestic European debate in the other 26 member states.
David Cameron’s Wednesday speech has been received with mixed emotions, being variously termed “most irrational” by continental pro-Europeans (Joschka Fischer), celebrated as “bang on” by Eurosceptic Tories (Boris), challenged as “wholly implausible” by the coalition partner (Clegg), and trending as #TheHokeyCokeySpeech on Twitter (Ben Fenton, FT). Where lauding and critical voices were in agreement, though, was that the 23rd of January marked a radical change for Britain and the EU. While it was certainly a sly move in terms of domestic politics, the extent to which it will alter British relations with the EU is questionable.
Cameron has put UK Labour in an impossible dilemma. Outright opposition to Cameron’s veto will certainly be picked apart by political opponents of all spectra as undemocratic – a beautifully populist, albeit technically debateable, argument. On the other hand an endorsement would make Labour look weak (compare the heat the German SPD has taken over four years of supporting the government’s perennial European rescue packages, a policy without alternative for a party actually seeking an extended version of European solidarity). The third alternative is clearly the least feasible: outdoing Cameron, e.g. by calling for an earlier referendum or setting out opening demands in the announced negotiations about power repatriation, would be a turnaround of the traditionally (relatively) Euro-friendly course Labour has steered, and would certainly repel many of its core voters.
In this sense it is entirely flawed to deride Labour for having “fallen into another Tory elephant trap” (Telegraph). They are caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of endorsing or condemning Cameron, with the current middle course the only feasible route to navigate. While inaction is always punished in public perception, both by media and the ‘vociferous minority’, it will ultimately probably prove feasible in electoral terms with a ‘loud majority’ realising that it, indeed, is too early to announce a referendum five years ahead of its date, with such uncertainty being harmful not only to business but equally to relations with European partners, and ultimately even socially disruptive by inflating rather than giving closure to, the divisive issue of Europe. Claiming that it will actually prove beneficial to Labour in the 2015 campaign, though, would be too bold.
Thus the second part of the widespread continental perspective, that David Cameron risks the European project for petty electoral politics, contains a large grain of truth. Arguably though, the more uncontested first part of the statement, that Cameron’s new course actually heralds a major turnaround for the Union, is less stable upon closer analysis.
To realise this, one must look closely at what Cameron actually said, as opposed to the isolated bits that made the Daily Mail headlines the morning after. Rather than promising an in-out referendum on the current EU, merely postponed until after the next election to ensure a genuine mandate (for not only the outcome of, but the referendum itself – leaving aside the re-election motive (as big as a caveat that may be), a remarkably democratic move for Cameron), the major section of DC’s speech was a detailed pledge for a reformed EU. His analysis that the current EU is losing its democratic standing in public perception, mutating to an image of “something that is done to people,” is a statement most European leaders would find themselves agreeing to, and the ‘democratic deficit’ has been a recurrent theme in the political science literature on Europe since 1979 (with our very own LSE harbouring with Simon Hix – the world’s foremost, and still very active, scholar on it). That culturally nation states will retain their predominance vis-à-vis supranationalism is another truth elucidated by four years of crisis, irrespective of how deplorable one may find that. That Europe needs more competitiveness has in fact long left the realm of the vocal and has been translated to actual policy in the structural reform drives occurring in most European states since 2010, and was welcomed and echoed by Angie just yesterday at the Davos summit. That significant technical economic changes are imminently necessary even within the Eurozone 17 is clearly shown by the devaluation-dilemma of Greece, Spain and Portugal.
Cameron’s pledges are thus much less “heresy” than they may appear. And that is why they will not lead to a radical reinvention of the Union. The Union itself has a strong incentive to retain its second-largest net donor, and a mainstay of European culture for centuries – but they will not do this at any price. The signature of the fiscal compact by 25 of the 27, driven forward by a strong, leading Germany not afraid to show Britain its limits, was a clear signal: we will do it without you if we need to. A vital detail that DC was careful not to break to his audience was that any European treaty change requires consent from each of the 26 other states individually, rather than any central European institution – given the widespread wariness of asking European populations directly about their feelings about treaty change (with Lisbon raising bad memories), this is a no-go, and the framework for negotiation is thus limited to institutional changes that can occur without screwing around with the fundamental treaties. The main possibility for this is further integration of Eurozone countries without British participation, with a second ‘ring’ of European states having the single market rather than the single currency as their connector, in what one may imagine as a set of concentric circles – and isn’t this precisely what DC explicitly suggested on Wednesday? Crucially, Cameron’s second set of demands, those of a non-economic nature, are only tangentially related to negotiations with the EU at all, another detail DC is always careful to leave unmentioned in European polemics: especially the widely deplored international restrictions on British judicial decisions are, in many cases, hand-downs from the European Court of Human Rights, a body subordinated to the Council of Europe, and thus entirely distinct from the EU. (The Council of Europe was founded in 1949, almost a decade prior to the European Economic Community, and includes 47 countries, including Switzerland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Again, there is only limited scope for change.
Covertly, the British awareness of its less-strong-than-pronounced negotiating position implies that a system of variable geometry that Cameron implicitly called for is indeed feasible and likely. How this will look in institutional detail is open for prediction; but incentives to retain Europe are too strong to risk the entire project, and once Cameron’s re-election purpose has been fulfilled, he will be careful not to push it. Both Cameron and his European partners have a strong incentive to explore the loopholes presented in his speech for ‘change’ that is maximal in loudness and publicity-potential and minimal in substantive content.
Thus in fact, DC left open a gaping wide escape exit from his own commitment. A variety of token concessions will be made to allow the PM to present his electorate with what appears as a veritably changed EU, and it is a reasonable prediction that British voters will be very surprised by the Europhilic rhetoric that will come forth from their PM as 2017 draws closer. At the same time, the Union will move further forward on its path to a reformed multispeed Europe.
By Konstantin Sietzy
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