“Every Door Swings on its Hinges" - The Return of Andrej Babiš and Hard-Right Opportunism in Czech Politics

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

In the small Central European nation of Czechia, the recent election victory for the hard-right mirrors the rest of Europe’s shift on issues such as Ukraine and the EU. This article will chronologically explore how, since 2017, Czechia’s hard right has adapted politically to an increasingly fragmented geopolitical climate and why this shift is cause for concern in Brussels and Kyiv.

In 2017, the Czech government was run by the centre-left Social Democrats (ČSSD) in coalition with the centre-right Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and ANO2011 – a right-wing populist party. ANO2011 (or just ANO) is led by Andrej Babiš, a billionaire who, in 2011, formed the “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” movement against corruption. Despite being in government, Babiš frequently criticised his own coalition partners, managing to retain his anti-establishment credentials whilst being seen as responsible for substantial economic growth. Due to this dynamic, his personal popularity increased dramatically. The 2017 legislative election delivered 29% of the vote for ANO; meanwhile, the Social Democrats dropped to 7%, and the Christian Democrats dropped to 6%. Babiš became Prime Minister on the backs of his former partners, showcasing his guile and pursuit of power.

This more Machiavellian approach to politics carries into ANO’s first time being the largest party in government. Two no-confidence votes in his first year alone resulted in a destabilisation of Babiš’s position. However, like many European populists proposing simple solutions to complex problems, Babiš started opposing the “Brussels bureaucracy” in the EU for its restriction of Czech national sovereignty and, according to Babiš, pursuing climate policies that are undeliverable and “unsustainable”. Consequently, the European Commission was wary of Babiš and his capability to block EU policy (as certain decisions, such as the accession of states, require unanimity). However, the EU did not have to worry about Babiš’s veto power for long, as he got caught up in a scandal; he was found guilty of being a contact for the State Security Police (StB) of the former Czechoslovak communist republic. Babiš was also mentioned in the “Pandora Papers”, a series of documents leaked to the global press naming several heads of government who had mismanaged their finances. In Babiš’s case, this resulted in using an offshore investment company to buy 16 properties, including a property in the French Riviera worth £18.5 million. The ANO leader’s political talents refocused on maintaining his popularity, even shifting to a more pro-EU stance given the prospect of having to rely on the Social Democrats once again, even as ANO slipped into second place in opinion polling for the first time since the election.

The country has been limping along with an ANO minority government kept afloat by Social   Democrats (ČSSD) and Communists (KSČM); however, when the legislative election came around in October 2021, it brought with it a new challenger for ANO: SPOLU (“Together”) formed as a centre-right bloc, including the mainstream Civic Democrats, Christian Democrats, and TOP 09 (a liberal conservative party). The result was exceptionally close, with SPOLU winning 28% compared to ANO’s 27%. SPOLU leader Petr Fiala became Prime Minister, going into coalition with PaS (a progressive bloc of the Pirates and Mayoral independents).

Never one to give up, Babiš began laying the groundwork for a presidential run in 2023. He shifted to adapt to the new political climate by attempting to project himself as a peace candidate to deal with the new Russia-Ukraine War, a stark shift from expelling diplomats in solidarity with the UK in 2018. In June 2022, he demanded an end to Czech aid for Ukraine, and during his 2023 presidential bid, he called for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to end the war and criticised his rivals’ support for Ukraine as well as Babiš stating his opposition to Ukrainian accession to the EU. Whilst the pro-NATO and pro-EU presidential candidate Petr Pavel won with 58%, the fact that Babiš still received 41% of the vote suggests he continues to carry substantial political influence and that pro-Russian views held electoral weight. This result lays the foundation for a markedly different kind of foreign policy if ANO ever returned to power.

Despite his defeat, ANO’s veteran leader turned to embattled Prime Minister Petr Fiala, who had a record low approval rating of just 16%. With rising inflation and an economic recession, SPOLU was weakened politically, slipping into second place in polling. September 2024’s midterm elections saw SPOLU lose four senators and the Pirates lose one. In response, Fiala removed the head of his coalition partner, the Pirates, from his ministerial role, prompting the Pirates to leave the coalition and leaving Fiala’s government with only a four-seat majority in the lower house. The infighting expanded ANO’s lead to 14% in November 2024, and Babiš’s strategy of stepping back and letting his opponents undermine their own political capital was proving successful. In 2025, ANO claimed victory once again, securing 35% compared to SPOLU’s 23%, ensuring that once again Babiš would be Prime Minister, having put together a coalition with the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party and the Motorists; however, now in a substantially more unstable and volatile European political climate than before.

This narrative of Babiš’s return to the office of prime minister mirrors a growing pattern in the EU: that communities that feel left behind seek to upend the status quo by voting for populist political extremes. In eastern and central Europe, many of these populists have already won elections, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and his national-conservative party Fidesz, or Slovakia’s Robert Fico and the left-wing nationalist Direction-SD. Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia have a unique history of partnership, being three members of the Visegrad Group, an organisation formed in 1991 to promote their shared interests. For Brussels, the trauma of the 2015 migrant crisis rings faintly in the background, as it was the Visegrad group (including Poland as its fourth member) that frustrated EU plans to alleviate the crisis. Now, with Czechia joining Hungary and Slovakia in adopting less-than-pro-Ukraine positions, alongside Poland seeing the hard-right Law and Justice Party win its recent presidential election, the EU must tread carefully, as it's not just the accession of states that requires unanimity but also common defence and security policy.

Babiš’s dramatic return to office is not just a microcosm of the political state of Europe, but it also comes at a crucial time for Brussels and Kyiv. The United States pursues a foreign policy at odds with EU aims and Ukraine’s best interests, actively arguing Europe is experiencing a “stark prospect of civilizational erasure”, directly parroting Kremlin talking points about the West’s “moral hypocrisy”. At the best of times, the US is an unreliable ally, and at the worst, it seems to favour Moscow over the EU. Therefore, Babiš’s position within the EU and Visegrad group frustrates EU policy at a crucial time when there are calls for “strategic autonomy” away from the US.  With war on the continent and populism on the march, history may write that the 1.9 million people who voted for ANO this year may inadvertently have decided the fates of millions more.

Written by Jonathan Walford-Phekoo

Edited by Lisanne Koehler