Winning without Majorities: How Europe’s Far Right Conquers by Controlling the Argument

Source: Wikimedia Commons

When Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), unexpectedly topped the Dutch general election in November 2023, the general consensus was that of a “political earthquake”. Similar language followed the Alternative fũr Deutschland’s (AfD) victory in becoming the largest opposition party in the German parliament in 2025. The rise of these parties cannot be reduced to a sudden ideological shift or algorithmic radicalisation. What their trajectories show is that right-wing populist success in Europe today stems from control of political narratives, an ability to exploit crises, and a deepening distrust in traditional parties.

This article uses the PVV and the AfD as examples to demonstrate how far-right movements gain power not merely by mobilising their patrons, but by reshaping the issues on which elections are fought.

The PVV and its Growing Importance in Dutch Politics

For years, the far-right party PVV was viewed as a loud, but electorally contained force in Dutch politics. That changed in 2023, when the coalition government collapsed over disagreements surrounding asylum policy. The refugee crisis became the defining issue of the campaign. Municipalities had warned of unmanageable pressure of the Distribution Act (Spreidingswet), and the national government appeared paralysed. 

Dutch media have extensively documented the strain on asylum seekers and public frustration with the government’s inability to fix it. PVV leader Wilders capitalised upon this general discontent by tying migration, or broadly cultural issues, to housing shortages, public safety, and cultural decline. In October 2015, PVV introduced a hotline where “citizens can report nuisance by asylum seekers,” citing themselves as “the only political party that listens [to citizens]”. 

While there was wide condemnation of the hotline, this strategy appeared to resonate electorally, given that opinion polling shortly afterwards recorded a rise in PVV support to 20.6% in September 2015. Rather than advancing detailed policy proposals, the PVV instead mobilised an effective narrative of betrayal that was easy to communicate to voters and harder to rebut by opponents.

The centre-right VVD, led by Dilan Yeşilgǒz, attempted to toughen its stance on asylum in parallel. However, this shift inadvertently legitimised PVV’s framing. As more mainstream parties discussed immigration, the more central the issue became, but always on Wilders’ terms. By the election date, the PVV had not only surged, but it had also redefined the political script. Migration became the lens through which voters evaluated all parties. 

The AfD: How Extremist Vocabulary Boosted National Relevance

If the Dutch PVV shows how a single dominant issue can propel a far-right party into national relevance, the German AfD illustrates how strategic crisis exploitation keeps a party influential even as it faces moral outrage and institutional scrutiny.

A defining episode came in early 2024 when Correctiv, a non-profit research institute, alleged that notable AfD figures attended a secret meeting in Potsdam where they discussed plans for the remigration of millions, including German citizens of foreign descent. The story sparked Germany’s largest anti-far-right demonstrations since German reunification in 1991. 

Politically, the scandal ought to have been devastating for the party. Major news outlets emphasised its extremist undertones, with German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier condemning it as an assault on democracy. Yet polling in the following weeks showed that the AfD largely stood unwavering, and in parts of eastern Germany, slightly strengthened prior to the 2025 German federal election. While AfD initially denied these conversations as a smear campaign by the media, Alice Weidel, co-chairwoman of the AfD, later embraced the term remigration ahead of the 2025 federal elections, declaring: “...And I have to be honest with you: if it’s going to be called remigration, then that’s what it’s going to be: remigration.” 

For weeks after, German political debate focused on the definition, legality, and implications of remigration. Even though nearly all coverage was critical, the concept itself gained unprecedented visibility. This is how extremist language enters the mainstream: not because people agree with it, but because they cannot stop talking about it. 

Europe's Far-Right Surge

The PVV and AfD reveal something important about European politics today. The far right is not winning on the strength of its ideas, but because it adapts to crises in ways that traditional parties fail to do. These movements succeed by positioning themselves strategically at moments when institutions are failing, whether the issues pertain to migration or the lack of trust in governance, rather than fundamentally changing what most people believe. 

Europe is living through overlapping “disruptions” such as climate change, energy insecurity, and the aftershocks of the pandemic. These challenges are inherently complex, and when policy explanations become technical and fragmented, it becomes difficult to translate them into everyday experience. The far-right fills this communication vacuum with persuasive narratives. Wilders moved asylum administration failures to the top of public discourse. These persuasive narratives do not need to be accurate, just emotionally legible. Reframing “how should we manage migration?” to “who do we become if we do not stop them?” gives far-right actors a structural advantage such that identity conflicts cannot be solved through technocratic compromise. They keep issues permanently open, emotionally mobilised, and resistant to correction. Mainstream parties fall into the trap of responding with technical clarifications when the far right defines the stakes in moral terms.

The PVV victory and AfD’s relevance show how quickly previously unthinkable positions can enter and legitimise themselves in contemporary political debate. Importantly, this is not solely driven by supporters of the far-right, but also by mainstream parties that want to match public concern, the media cycle that amplifies controversy, and debates that legitimise rhetoric simply by engaging with it. A political idea becomes normalised long before it garners support. Once it becomes discussable, it becomes governable. 

This is why far-right parties only need to dominate the political discourse to influence national politics. They are not merely filling a political vacuum, but a narrative one. The PVV and AfD do not succeed because Europeans are becoming uniformly radical, but rather because they define political narratives by turning crises into identity conflicts and forcing other parties to respond on their terms. Until mainstream parties learn to regain narrative authority by explaining policies clearly, acknowledging tradeoffs, and addressing local social disparities, the far right will continue to define European politics. The PVV and AfD do not need majorities. They need to win the argument they forced everyone to have. 

Written by Joshitaa Johnson-Jeyaraj

Edited by Lisanne Koehler