Galamsey In Ghana: An Aggressive Form of Neocolonialism or the Lovechild of Equal Sino-Ghanaian Responsibility?

The current state of River Pra due to illegal alluvial mining activities on the river. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Earlier this year, a national debate erupted when the former deputy CEO of the Ghana Tourism Development Company called for the removal of all signposts in Ghana bearing Chinese inscriptions. Her words struck a nerve because they tap into something far deeper than signage.

They speak to a growing unease about national identity, cultural sovereignty, and the visibility of foreign influence in Ghana’s public spaces. But these signposts are not appearing in a vacuum. Behind the rise of the Chinese language in the country’s bustling commercial centres lies a more contentious issue: the surge of Chinese migration fuelled by illegal small-scale gold mining, known colloquially as ‘galamsey’.

From the early 2000s, news spread like wildfire around Beijing of promises of easily attainable wealth as a result of a global price hike in gold. Private Chinese citizens began forming small groups to pool financial resources from their homeland. This resulted in an estimated 50,000 miners having left China for Ghana by 2013. 

Exploitation in Ghana: Neocolonialism with Chinese Characteristics?

Foreign involvement in galamsey has brought on disastrous environmental consequences. While legal artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operators use techniques such as “panning”, which refers to washing sediments with a sieve so gold settles at the bottom, illegal operators often introduce mercury and cyanide to more easily find gold. The widespread use of mercury has severely contaminated soil and major river bodies, compromising the quality of drinking water for nearby communities. The situation has become so critical that Ghana Water Company Limited, the sole government-owned water utility company in Ghana, has warned that the country could be importing water by 2030 if illegal gold mining remains unchecked.

This ecological damage stretches beyond waterbodies. Farmlands, particularly those that house Ghana's primary export cocoa, suffer from heavy erosion, reduced soil infiltration and consequent loss of land productivity. It is estimated that more than 100,000 acres of cocoa farms have been destroyed through galamsey operations.

An increasing body of scholarship has framed Chinese involvement in galamsey as a form of neocolonialism, pointing to ongoing challenges surrounding resource sovereignty and the fair distribution of Ghana’s mineral wealth. Neocolonialism, which was first coined by Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah, describes the external domination of supposedly independent nations, achieved not through overt colonisation but through economic dependency, political interference, and resource exploitation.

It is crucial to distinguish Western neocolonialism and the emerging Chinese variant. Postcolonial thinkers frame Western neocolonialism as a continuation of power dynamics between former colonies and Western powers into the post-independence era, sustained through asymmetrical economic structures, strategic dependence, and cultural dominance.

This shift emerged in response to African nations gaining independence: for many European states whose economies had long relied on African resources and markets, independence posed a threat to economic interests, prompting the development of new forms of control.

Although neocolonial powers tend to exercise their neocolonial power and influence in a former colony, it is not always the case. As asserted by Nkrumah, “Where neo-colonialism exists, the power exercising control is often the State which formerly ruled the territory in question, but this is not necessarily so.” This is where Chinese neocolonialism sits.

Neocolonial Extraction in Ghana’s Mining Sector

When applied to Ghana’s mining sector, neocolonialism becomes visible through growing dependence on Chinese capital and technology. Before the arrival of foreign miners, ASM historically involved indigenous methods and simple tools like the pickaxe, shovel, and head pans.

The introduction of heavy mechanisation in the form of excavators and bulldozers transformed this into highly destructive operations. The result is a form of extraction that enriches foreign investors while accelerating ecological degradation, entrenching Ghana’s vulnerability rather than strengthening its sovereignty.

The mechanisation of galamsey has produced lucrative outcomes for Chinese investors. Officials in Shanglin, a county in China, had estimated that in the peak years over 10 billion yuan, approximately USD 1.5 billion, flowed through the county’s financial institutions each year, according to 2018 figures.

However, the economic boom has been unequally distributed.

In the current arrangement, Chinese partners, who provide the financing, retain as much as 85% of the value of the gold extracted, while Ghanaian counterparts receive only 15% of the proceeds. The illegality of this involvement in galamsey means that foreign investors are able to evade making tax payments in Ghana by selling their gold outside the country.

In 2016, it was estimated that USD 2.3 billion worth of gold left Ghana through illicit mining. Consequently, an economic structure is created wherein profits from resource extraction flow disproportionately to foreign entities, leaving Ghana to bear the environmental and social costs.

Is Chinese Involvement Entirely at Fault?

We should, however, be cautious when assigning the entire blame for the galamsey crisis to foreign influence since Chinese involvement in galamsey has been aided by corrupt Ghanaian elites and local patrons.

Although small-scale mining is, by law, restricted to Ghanaians, Chinese companies often secure contracts for mining operations through partnerships with corrupt landowners. For instance, some Ghanaian government officials have been found to provide false immigration documents for a fee, while local small-scale mine procure mining licenses on behalf of Chinese businessmen.

Many political officials have even suggested that Ghana’s reliance on China for development assistance, infrastructure finance and low-interest loans translates to a lack of commitment to prosecute illegal miners migrating from the State.

Research indicates that China has even altered the ground rules for granting future loans to Ghana by including a soft condition that obliges the Government of Ghana to resolve Chinese illegal miners’ issues within the Sino-Ghanaian diplomatic rules of engagement. Consequently, this means that political caution overrides legal accountability as Ghanaian policymakers are motivated to prioritise diplomatic and economic interests over strict enforcement of laws.

This has resulted in lenient outcomes on the ground with many illegal miners, including famously Aisha Huan, facing deportation rather than prosecution. While one interpretation is that Ghana is strategically prioritising foreign affairs at the expense of environmental concerns, this can also be understood as China leveraging its economic and international strength to perpetuate a cycle of exploitation and dependency using finance as leverage.

Though Chinese capital, technology and greed have accelerated the process of destruction and produced a cycle of exploitation, it could not have been done without the complicity of Ghanaian actors, corruption and the weakness of regulatory institutions. For Ghana to reclaim control over its resources and future, the country has a responsibility to control both sides of this partnership.

Pathways to Protecting the Sector

Nathaniel Ocquaye, a postgraduate programme officer at the London School of Economics and Political Science, argues that there is a need for Ghana to thoroughly examine and regulate all finance and equipment coming into the country. Cutting off the supply of mining resources to locals will quickly slow the destruction of waterbodies and farmlands.

Importantly, the Ghanaian government must stop prioritising diplomatic ties and access to cheap loans over the livelihoods of residents in mining communities and the future of agricultural production. When policymakers take the environmental and social costs of galamsey as seriously as its short-term economic gains, stronger regulation and genuine enforcement will follow.

A long-term solution requires the Ghanaian government to tackle the core reason why locals remain complicit in obtaining licenses for Chinese investors in exchange for small percentages, namely, unemployment and limited economic opportunities. Providing alternative livelihood options, by investing in agriculture and small-scale industries in mining communities, could reduce dependence on illicit activities and promote sustainable economic growth.

China, too, has room for responsibility. The state should remove soft conditions regarding illegal miners’ issues and instead provide Ghana with financial resources and technical expertise as a sign of goodwill in its bilateral relations with the latter. Additionally, the country should prioritise querying large sums of gold and money entering the country for suspicious origins.

Ultimately, meaningful progress demands accountability on both sides. Ghana must strengthen governance and empower citizens with viable alternatives, while China must act not as a benefactor of exploitation but as a genuine development partner. Only then can the cycle of dependency and environmental degradation be broken.

Written by Hanan Banda

Edited by Ruth Otim