For over 30 years, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been afflicted with armed conflict and instability, a crisis described by the UN’s International Organisation for Migration (IOM) as “one of the most complex and multifaceted in the world”. More than 6 million people have died with a further 8 million displaced as a result of hunger and disease- circumstances fuelled by ethnic, territorial and resource-based violence. The main drivers of the conflict are rebel militias, of which there are over 100 operating in the DRC due to decades of arming and counter-arming by successive Congolese governments and other foreign actors. These militias dominate the resource-rich eastern and northeastern regions of the DRC, where another key power, China, is increasingly extending its influence.
As part of its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ launched in 2013, China has undertaken significant infrastructure investment projects in most African nations. Its total investment in the DRC is projected to reach USD 7 billion, yet timelines for the distribution of the funds have not been finalised. Although both Chinese and Congolese leadership acknowledge the mutually beneficial nature of these deals, evidenced by the recently renegotiated ‘Sicomines project’, concerns persist about the global power imbalance between the two countries. Critics question whether China’s involvement in key Congolese industries is a form of ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy, potentially exacerbating the DRC’s regional conflict.
One source of concern is the extent of China’s control over critical minerals in the DRC, evidenced by its ownership of 15 of the country's 17 cobalt mines. Cobalt, a raw material widely used in the manufacturing of commercial, military and climate security technologies, has made China an increasingly influential player in global supply chains. Its dominance in cobalt strengthens its geopolitical leverage and heightens the world's dependence on China for the green energy transition and military technology. This influence may explain why other nations overlook the opacity surrounding the 'Sicomines project' - which grants China mining rights in the region - as well as labour rights abuses against mine workers and environmental concerns affecting the localities involved. Among these violations are the exposure of workers to dangerous worksites, forced evictions of locals, and the use of child labour, with the US Department of Labour estimating the presence of 25,000 children in DRC’s cobalt mines. By exploiting governance loopholes in the DRC, China's actions may indirectly fuel local grievances and subsequently instability in the region.
There is no substantive evidence to suggest that Chinese companies have directly engaged with armed groups vying for control of the DRC’s mineral reserves. However, it is crucial to note that insurgent groups have historically financed their operations through the smuggling of cobalt, copper, and gold, with involvement from the Rwanda, Ugandan, and even Congolese military. While Chinese companies are not explicitly implicated in these activities, poor regulatory oversight and a lack of accountability regarding the uses of mining profits make it difficult to ascertain whether these funds fall into the hands of rebel militias, potentially worsening the regional conflict.
Another concern surrounding China’s BRI investments in the DRC is the risk of creating a ‘debt trap’, in which the recipient nation struggles to service these loans and interest repayments. When compared to the sub-Saharan African (SSA) average of 57% of GDP, the public debt ratio in the DRC is relatively low at about 15% of GDP (2022 figures), yet Chinese debt represents a substantial 6% of it. While critics of the BRI often focus on China's potential to leverage this debt for geopolitical gain, the DRC faces a more immediate challenge in the form of economic dependence on China. This reliance forces the DRC to prioritise extraction agreements that benefit China, leaving fewer resources for critical investments in appropriate social services, development-related initiatives, and conflict resolution. This asymmetric bilateral relationship is arguably prolonging the conflict in the region, and deepening it by promoting disillusionment amongst Congolese citizens, mine workers and most dangerously, rebel militias. The extremity of this frustration was highlighted earlier this year when an attack on a Chinese-run gold mine in Ituri left 6 workers dead.
On the other hand, China’s extensive investments in the DRC- and generally across countries in SSA- have been correlated with a rise in its macroeconomic performance. These investments may therefore be viewed as contributing positively to the region’s economic development, especially since Western superpowers like the US have not yet offered a robust alternative to African infrastructure projects. Given the DRC's existing challenges, including ongoing conflict, corruption and a poorly established judicial system, the nation has struggled to attract investment from foreign businesses. As a result, China's involvement has been welcomed by the DRC government, despite the uneven distribution of benefits, which tends to favour the investors.
Furthermore, unlike Western partnerships, which are often accompanied by demands of democratic reform, anti-corruption measures and satisfactory human rights provisions, China’s non-interference policy might be seen as a more sovereignty-preserving option for the DRC. However, the economic benefits of China’s presence are limited by the power imbalance between the two parties and the lack of competitive funding proposals from other international players. This leaves China with little incentive to negotiate more balanced agreements.
A key area of concern regarding China’s role in the DRC is its provision of CH-4 military drones to the Congolese army. So far, the DRC has received 9 of these drones, which could intensify existing tensions with Rwanda. The drones are intended to aid the DRC in controlling the Rwandan-backed militias that have closed in on the major Congolese city of Goma; however, researchers from the news site, ‘Africa Intelligence’, have expressed worry that these weapons could end up in hostile hands and lead to greater instability in the region. They even suggest that China pursues a deliberate lack of transparency surrounding arms sales both to avoid global scrutiny and to solidify its relationship with resource-rich African countries. This opacity could serve as a way for China to ‘test the reaction of the West’ in terms of their willingness to engage diplomatically in the continent.
In response to these concerns, it can be argued that China’s military support is facilitating progress towards conflict resolution in the DRC as it is helping the Congolese government confront entrenched militias at the root of the violence. Additionally, China’s efforts may be interpreted as partially filling the void left by the UN peacekeeping troops mission, which had spent two decades battling insurgent activity before withdrawing at the DRC government’s request, citing inefficiency and failure to protect civilians. However, the opacity surrounding China’s military involvement, especially the nature of its interactions with state and non-state actors, raises questions about accountability particularly if drones are misused or misplaced. This was evident during the Ethiopian Civil War, where Chinese drones were used to target rebel groups, violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only Ethiopian armed forces were charged with committing war crimes.
In summary, there are several reasons why China’s infrastructure investment in the DRC, particularly the operation of mineral mines, may be indirectly contributing to the prolongation and exacerbation of the conflict. These include the intensification of local grievances as a result of unregulated labour and environmental practices, the unintentional diversion of mining profits and weaponry to insurgents, and the reduction of the DRC government’s capacity to invest in development initiatives whilst prioritising Chinese economic interests. To mitigate these risks, the Sino-Congolese partnership should move toward greater transparency about the details of investment agreements, strengthen regulatory frameworks, and enforce anti-corruption measures. To reduce the economic implications of an asymmetric power relationship between the two countries, competitive foreign alternatives to Chinese investment should be explored, especially those that focus on helping the DRC add value to their raw material exports rather than purely facilitating mineral resource extraction.
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