How a Media Outlet’s Shutdown Became a Symbol for Kyrgyzstan’s Lapse into Central Asia’s Authoritarian Order
- Bhuvan Anantham
- 7 days ago
- 8 min read
On 30 November, 2025, Kyrgyzstan held snap elections after dissolving its parliament in September. Political analysts suspected the timing of such elections was an instrument for incumbent President Sadyr Japarov to quash dissent by reinforcing his legitimacy. However, a turnout of just 37 percent — with an absence of significant opposition — failed to deliver a strong mandate to the President’s allies. Ostensibly, the elections were unproblematic with no meaningful fraud or intimidation of the voters, who reportedly praised this positive change from past practices. However, the democratic veneer of the electoral process masks the restrictive campaign rules, limits of political speech and crackdowns on independent media, which rendered the election unfair and a foregone conclusion, accounting for the low turnout.
There have been significant precedents to the events in November. One of them is what became of Kloop Media.
In August 2024, the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan upheld the decision to shut down Kloop Media, a human rights-focused independent media outlet running since 2007. This was the end of a year-long legal battle pursued by the government that began with the Prosecutor’s office shutting down Kloop in August 2023, during which every ruling went against the media organisation.
Japarov has long held animosity against Kloop, labelling it “one-sided and used to circulate lies”. This could be due to Kloop’s commitment to transparency and truth which has hurt Japarov in the past, particularly in 2023 when their coverage of his relatives’ involvement in suspicious deals for a new FC Barcelona Academy in the country shone an uncomfortable spotlight on corruption. Such organisations, with such ethoses, tend to be viewed as threats by autocrats who favour opacity and an uninformed populace.
The decision to shut down Kloop has been condemned by pro-democracy forces both within Kyrgyzstan and globally. Local news organisation 24.kg underlined how the attacks on Kloop were part of a broader repression against liberties, which violate both Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional guarantees and international human rights obligations. “The forced closure of Kloop Media not only silences a crucial voice in Kyrgyzstani society but also signals a continued decline in Kyrgyzstan's respect for civil and political rights and freedoms of its citizens,” Hugh Williamson, the Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch, said in a 2024 statement. “This action undermines the public's right to information and further weakens the foundations of democratic governance in the country.”
Right before the shutdown, in October 2025, Japarov and the courts doubled down, labelling Kloop and their employees “extremist”, arresting several cameramen and sentencing two of them to five years in prison on charges of “public calls for mass arrest.” Kloop is not an isolated incident of assaults on media. In 2023, Japarov’s regime brought cases against Radio Free Europe, freezing its assets and blocking its website, and closed the news agency 24.kg for more than two months in January 2024, detaining its editors.
The backsliding of media freedoms are a stark contrast to the history of Kyrgyzstan, which, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, has been hailed as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia, with distinguishing features like an active political opposition, a vibrant civil society and independent media outlets. The country of 7.3 million people was unique for having a political trajectory that diverged sharply from its neighbours at the end of the Cold War. Kyrgyzstan was seen as “the most democratic and open society in Central Asia” by the Asian Development Bank, and unlike its neighbours, it privileged free and fair elections, inalienable rights for its citizens, and strong institutions with a genuine separation of powers established by its constitution. The differences in democratic outcomes are elucidated by a Freedom House report from 2000-2001, which classifies Kyrgyzstan as the only country in Central Asia to receive the rating of “Partly Free”, as compared to the rest of the region that was classified as “Not Free” for much of the 21st Century. Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian state to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1994, explicating its political leanings towards liberalism from the outset.
However, since President Japarov’s ascent to power at the end of 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s turn to authoritarianism has seen these democratic indicators progressively erode and the aforementioned ‘clean’ electoral processes are insufficient to hide the backsliding. In 2021, Freedom House downgraded Kyrgyzstan from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” as its score fell by 11 points the year after Japarov came to power, with restrictions on political liberties and the crumbling of a once vibrant civil society accounting for the drop.
In order to understand the rising authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan, it’s essential to dig deeper into what makes Kyrgyzstan an exceptional case for its democratic history in the first place.
Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan — which have vast oil and natural gas reserves — Kyrgyzstan lacks significant natural resources. Hence, these usual conditions for corruption, cronyism and concentration of power that afflict richly-endowed nations are absent in Kyrgyzstan, enabling it to avoid them. Additionally, the absence of hydrocarbon resources has compelled Kyrgyzstan to rely more on Western aid, which tends to be conditional on fostering liberal democratic values within the country, unlike the other Central Asian states that received trade and funding with no strings attached due to their resources.
USAID, for instance, had been a major sponsor of Kloop since its founding in 2007. Kloop is among many media outlets and other forms of civil society funded by the West. The growth of civil society had been the primary differentiating factor for Kyrgyzstan — by 2020, Kyrgyzstan had over 21,000 registered civil society organisations (CSOs). In contrast, Kazakhstan had less than 2,000 active CSOs, (many were government-organised with no meaningful independence), Uzbekistan has an estimated 3,000 independent CSOs, and Turkmenistan has officially registered just 136 NGOs. This marked difference in civil society development was foundational to Kyrgyzstan’s relative liberalism and translated into meaningful democratic policies.
Furthermore, this civil society capacity enabled Kyrgyzstan to self-correct through popular revolt when authoritarian tendencies crept up. In 2005, the Tulip Revolution — also known as the First Kyrgyz Revolution — overthrew then President Askar Akayev after disputed parliamentary elections. Five years later, another popular uprising, which Kloop reportedly facilitated and broadcasted, removed then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev following violent crackdowns on protesters. In both cases, mass mobilisation was able to keep the political elite in check when liberal norms were infringed, a phenomenon not seen elsewhere in the region. Both revolutions prompted a compelling narrative that civil society could enable democracy to take root and fend off challenges to it in the face of non-conformity with the region.
However, the authoritarian turn Kyrgyzstan has taken since 2020 has compelled experts and analysts to rethink this narrative and realise that the importance of civil society was overstated in the previous years.
Of the 21,000 CSOs registered, only a third are operational. Furthermore, nearly all CSOs in Kyrgyzstan rely on international grant funding, and the domestic revenue base is too low to sustain operations. As USAID fundings have receded steadily since 2010, so too has the operability of such CSOs and independent media like Kloop. Kyrgyzstan’s once-vibrant civil society now appears to have been nothing but a façade dependent on finite external funding, rendering its decline and Kyrgyzstan’s democratic backsliding inevitable.
Examining the regional climate sheds light on the apparent inevitability of Kyrgyzstan’s democratic backsliding. Three overlapping regional organisations — the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) — all of which Kyrgyzstan is a member, have been cited by political scientists like Alessandra Russo and Andrea Gawrich as evidence that authoritarian norms in the region, along with Russia and China, have permeated through these institutions and helped legitimise authoritarian rule.
The SCO defines threats to its member states in deliberately broad and ambiguous terms, allowing governments to label political opponents and civil society as ‘extremist’ without losing legitimacy. This is reminiscent of Japarov’s remarks towards Kloop, and the cameramen he jailed on the pretext of their extremism.
Citizen Lab, a Canada-based group examining threats to human rights, identified the illiberal norms the SCO promotes, stating, “The SCO framework is built upon normative agreements that present a regional alternative to established principles of international human rights law, as well as practices to confront non-traditional security threats that infringe upon human rights.” The SCO’s emphasis on non-interference gives governments carte blanche over their oppression of civil society, with international voices marginalised.
The CSTO’s protection of authoritarian states is best exemplified by the 2022 Kazakh Unrest. After protests over rising fuel prices led to calls for political reform, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested CSTO assistance. Within hours, his request was approved and 2,500 soldiers, primarily from Russia, were sent to violently suppress nonviolent protests, marking the organisation’s first intervention. Russian President Vladimir Putin unabashedly said he would “not allow so-called 'colour revolutions' to take place” in the region, ending hopes of democracy through revolution in Central Asia.
The EAEU differs from the European Union in a crucial way, in that it “respects the specificities of the political order of its member states,” a clear neglect of any human rights conditionality. This is unsurprising given the authoritarian regimes that are in the EAEU, but it highlights the difference in regional norms regarding liberalism between the Schengen Area and Central Asia.
Although one might reasonably question whether being a member of regional organisations alone constitutes proof of adopting other states’ political systems and norms, evidence of authoritarian policy transfer into Kyrgyzstan has been pointed to as indicating that such dictatorial norms have been adopted by Japarov. Kyrgyzstan’s 2024 ‘Foreign Representatives’ Law, mandating that CSOs receiving foreign funding must disclose their sources, has received widespread criticism from experts who see this as an effort to stigmatise CSOs, proclaiming the law as undemocratic. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, a nonprofit organisation, found that this law was substantially copied — more than 90 percent — from a similar law in Russia, showing clear adoption of Putin’s authoritarian characteristics by Japarov. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu delivered a statement in February 2024 alleging that CSOs in Central Asia were engaging in “anti-Russian activities”, and that Russia had taken “proactive measures”, demonstrating Russia’s considerable influence over the regions’ CSOs, of which Kyrgyzstan’s were likely oppressed. This ‘Foreign Representatives’ law sounded the death knell for Kyrgyzstan’s distinguishing civil society sector, typified by the Soros Foundation, which had allocated approximately 115 million to various projects over three decades, leaving the country due to the legal restrictions a month after the law was passed.
Japarov’s heavy-handedness — from banning protests to shutting down independent media — is not the norm in the country, but is in the region, as Central Asian states have engaged in such practices for decades. By using language legitimised by the SCO’s framework in labelling his opposition as extremists, as well as directly importing legislation, the region’s effects on Kyrgyzstan are undeniable to witness. Such regional influence and democratic backsliding were inevitable and only manifested recently due to the maturation of regional institutional architecture. The SCO had evolved from a border security forum into a comprehensive organization promoting authoritarian governance norms, the CSTO had demonstrated its willingness to intervene militarily to protect regimes, and the EAEU had created economic integration that deepened members' dependence on Russia.
Academic articles provide theoretical explanations with concepts like ‘illiberal solidarism’ and institutionalised authoritarianism with diffusion through authoritarian gravity centres. These gravity centres, through geographic proximity, facilitate high cross-border interactions, networks and aligning of interests, exercising both promotion and attraction towards their surrounding states. Shared norms regarding the nature of political institutions, acceptance of foreign interference or funding, and civil liberties permeate until all are aligned with the authoritarian gravity centre’s model. The resemblances to Central Asia are clear, with Russia as the undisputed regional hegemon and the other Central Asian states following its lead.
Remaining a democratic outlier in such a regional environment relied on sustained Western support, which were conditional upon strong domestic foundations of civil society. However, these never materialised given Kyrgyzstan’s external conditions. As regional integration strengthened, the authoritarian waves, lapping at Kyrgyzstan’s shores for decades, have grown more powerful, and the so-called ‘island of democracy’ appears to have finally sunk.
Written by Bhuvan Anantham
Edited by Pallavi Pundir
Comments