Flaw or Feature: Examining the US Government Shutdown

Image by Ian Hutchinson. Source: Unsplash

The longest US government shutdown in history ended on 12 November 2025, concluding a 43-day legislative standoff that began on 1 October 2025. Congress passed, and President Donald J. Trump signed legislation that would fund the government through 30 January 2026, reviving halted food assistance, restoring pay for federal employees, and resolving disruptions to air traffic control.

What is a Government Shutdown, and Why Did It Happen?

While political disagreements over funding are issues common to any government, a shutdown is a phenomenon unique to the American one. It occurs when Congress (consisting of two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate) fails to pass 12 appropriation bills – legislation which allocates funding and authorises the executive to spend – by the end of the fiscal year, which begins every 1 October. This results in what is called a ‘funding gap’, where, under the Anti-Deficiency Act, federal agencies operating under the executive branch of government, reliant on its budget, are unable to spend. Hence, during a government shutdown, as the name accurately implies, these federal agencies are forced to shut down: cease non-essential operations and furlough employees until Congress passes bills to resolve the funding gap. 

A shutdown lasting a few days causes some hassle. But a shutdown lasting weeks tells a different story. The halt in government operations not only directly affects more than 700,000 federal employees by delaying their pay, but also induces widespread frustrations for citizens as tax refunds stop, food assistance is cut, and national parks close, among other inconveniences. Economic impact is also notable – data from past shutdowns illustrate that federal furloughs and consumption decline cause a reduction in GDP growth, which, albeit temporary, indicates significant disruptions to the economy.

There have been four major government shutdowns in the US since 1981, but none were as prolonged and politically controversial as the most recent one, which was triggered by a deadlock over a bill that would cut healthcare subsidies that about 20 million Americans were dependent on to pay for their health insurance. As a result of the Democrats’ rigid stance on the matter, the Republicans were unable to get enough votes to end debate on their funding bill despite having a simple majority in both chambers of Congress. While a simple majority would be satisfactory for normal bill-passing which has a 51-vote requirement, it would be inadequate for ending a filibuster such as in this case.

Flaw or Framework: Unpacking the Design

On the surface, this goes to suggest that a government shutdown is, quite possibly, the manifestation of a systemic flaw in the structure and mechanisms of the American government which undoubtedly causes multidimensional difficulties for many, from federal employees to ordinary citizens. But from an alternative perspective, it is merely an indicative factor of a well-functioning democracy. 

Shutdowns stem from two features of the US system: separated spending powers and constitutional structures that forbid the executive from acting without appropriations. 

First, unlike parliamentary systems used by many democratic states which ensure that the executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same coalition or party, the American system allows the executive (i.e. the president) to be completely independent from the legislature (i.e. Congress). This creates multiple institutional veto points, such as the supermajority support requirement in the Senate, that can prevent the passage of essential legislation. This structure means that even when one party controls the presidency and both chambers of Congress, opposition minorities can still block funding bills, contrary to parliamentary systems, where legislation generally can be passed with simple majority support. This was precisely the dynamic demonstrated by the 2025 shutdown, where even with Republicans in control of the executive and both chambers of Congress with a simple majority, the Senate’s 60-vote requirement for passing a cloture motion allowed Democrats to block funding legislation. Senate Democrats used this as leverage to fight for their policies, and the resulting political disagreement led to a 43-day government shutdown. Hence, while this structure was designed with the intention to encourage compromise and deliberation, government shutdowns demonstrate that it can have the opposite effect of entrenching partisan conflict and reducing the democratic mechanism into a political bargaining chip.

This structural design is outlined by the US Constitution under the Appropriations Clause, which states that the law must allocate government budget to federal agencies. By allocating “the power of the purse” to the legislature, the US Constitution creates a highly effective checks-and-balances mechanism essential to uphold the principle of separation of powers, notwithstanding the complications that may arise. Moreover, due to the extremely entrenched nature of the US Constitution, this rule is more or less set in stone, forcing the actors to work around the system rather than find means to amend it. 

In the end, the question comes down to whether the virtue of upholding a democratic principle in a uniquely American way outweighs its potentially harmful consequences on the society it is meant to protect. To answer this, it may be helpful to evaluate how other countries avoid the same problems – and at what constitutional price. 

A comparison with other G7 governments illustrates how unusual the American shutdown phenomenon is. In parliamentary democracies such as the UK, Canada, and Japan, the executive is drawn from, and depends on the confidence of, the legislature. Budget bills are matters of confidence; if they fail to pass, the government falls, or an election is triggered. This fusion of powers prevents funding gaps altogether: political deadlock results not in halted public services, but in a change of government. Citizens in France’s semi-presidential system, for instance, vote for their president through direct popular vote, while a prime minister is nominated by the president. France’s constitution allows the prime minister to invoke Article 49(3) to force passage of the government’s bill, including budget bills. When invoked, the bill is considered automatically adopted unless the National Assembly passes a motion of no confidence, which would topple the government itself – definitely a possible risk, but not an annually recurrent one. These systems prioritise stability in executive functioning, often at the cost of weakening the legislature’s ability to delay and scrutinise budget plans. 

By contrast, the US deliberately empowers Congress to block appropriations without dissolving the executive, reflecting a constitutional commitment to legislative supremacy over public finance. The American design thus trades operational continuity for institutional independence: where other democracies prevent shutdowns by fusing or hierarchising powers, the US preserves them by rigidly separating authority. 

In the end, both interpretations hold weight. Shutdowns undeniably generate real harm – disrupting public services and eroding citizens’ trust – suggesting that the American system’s rigid separation of powers can, at times, function more as a liability than a safeguard mechanism. Yet systems that avoid shutdowns carry their own complications, as every structure resolves one problem only by accepting another. Parliamentary or semi-parliamentary systems like the UK, Canada, and France treat budget bills as a matter of government confidence, putting executive continuity at risk to prevent legislative obstruction. Ultimately, whether the costs imposed by a system outweigh the constitutional values it protects is a question without a single correct answer. 

Written by Sieeun Rhee

Edited by Charles Choi