From Island Chains to Alliance Networks: How Cold War Strategy is Undermining American Forward Presence in the Pacific

In June 2025, Chinese aircraft carriers sailed beyond the Second Island Chain for the first time. It was more than a naval demonstration; it undermined the geographic framework that characterises American strategy in the Indo-Pacific. China's military modernisation has exposed the strategic limitations of island chain thinking while its rhetoric reduces sovereign partners to links in a containment chain, making the framework politically untenable. 

For over seven decades, American strategists have conceived Pacific defence through island chains. The First Island Chain runs from the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines, forming a natural barrier along China's coastline. The Second Island Chain extends from Japan's main islands through the Bonin Islands, the US territory of Guam, to New Guinea. The Third Island Chain stretches from Alaska’s Aleutians through Hawaii to New Zealand and Australia, anchored firmly in American sovereign territory rather than allied nations, more closely representing homeland security rather than forward presence. 

During the Cold War, this framework offered a compelling argument. It provided clear geographic markers for containment strategy, translating abstract geopolitical competition into concrete defensive perimeters. More specifically, the island chains offered natural choke points where American naval and air power could monitor and, if necessary, restrain Chinese military movements. Importantly, the framework appeared to be strategically efficient: a small number of key positions could theoretically control vast maritime spaces, allowing Washington to project power across the Pacific without maintaining expensive permanent deployments throughout the region. 

Source: Runfola, D. et. al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231866

The Cost of Containment Rhetoric 

Yet in 2026, this island chain framework for containment is contradictory to what should be a modern alliance-based deterrence network. The contradiction operates through three distinct mechanisms. It alienates partners by reducing their sovereign agency to mere geography. When American officials describe island chains designed to constrain China, it suggests partners matter primarily for their location, not their interests or capabilities. Also, such rhetoric validates Chinese narratives of aggressive American encirclement, handing Beijing a diplomatic victory. In addition, the containment framework narrows cooperation to military positioning, foreclosing opportunities for broader partnership across economic, technological, and diplomatic domains that might prove more durable than relationships based solely on defence. 

Partners across Southeast Asia and the Pacific increasingly resist being characterised as mere links in an American attempt at encircling China. This rhetorical fault has structural consequences. When partners resist being characterized as links in a containment chain, they limit American access at a moment when US-China relations have become the most tense since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996. 

It is important to note that modern forward presence encompasses more than permanent military bases. It includes rotational deployments, access agreements, joint exercises, and most importantly the political relationships that make all this possible. The island chain metaphor undermines this political dimension by reducing sovereign states to static defensive positions. The island chain framework strips potential allies of their agency by implying their value lies only in their location relative to China. 

When Washington positions the region as a battleground in great power competition, it reinforces precisely the dynamic Southeast Asian nations seek to avoid. ASEAN leaders have made clear that they believe Southeast Asia must engage with both the US and China. In 2025, Singaporean Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing stated, “If we have to choose sides, may we choose the side of principles.” This is not mere rhetoric. After the Trump administration released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2019, explicitly framing the region through the lens of US-China competition, ASEAN responded by releasing its own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific as pushback.  

This hedging strategy manifests in concrete policy choices. The Philippines, despite strengthening its defence treaty with the United States through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, has dramatically expanded infrastructure partnerships with China under the Belt and Road Initiative. Singapore hosts American naval facilities and conducts regular military exercises with US forces yet remains China's largest foreign investment destination in ASEAN. These examples show regional states actively pursue dual engagement rather than binary alignment. 

A 2024 survey by Singapore's ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found that, for the first time, regional elites would likely side with China by a slim margin during a conflict with the United States, given no other choice. This reflects growing frustration with being treated as pawns of great power rivalry rather than partners with agency. 

When American officials describe island chains designed to constrain China, it suggests to partners that their interests are secondary to their geography. This makes cooperation appear transactional. Washington values Manila for access to Luzon Strait and Tokyo for the Ryukyu Islands. Such framing fundamentally misunderstands what sustains American influence in the region. For the US to maintain its position in international society it must not act through transactional relationships based on geographic convenience, but rather by demonstrating that partnership with Washington serves partners' own interests in ways alignment with rival powers cannot.

China has exploited this American misstep. Beijing portrays US strategy as aggressive encirclement whilst positioning itself as offering partnership focused on development and mutual benefit rather than military confrontation. American rhetoric that was designed to signal resolve instead undermines the partnerships that make credible forward presence possible. 

This is not to suggest that geography has become irrelevant. The People's Liberation Army has invested heavily in amphibious assault capabilities precisely because islands remain critical to controlling maritime approaches. The importance of insular geography has, if anything, increased in a time when amphibious warfare capabilities are central to both Chinese offensive plans and American defensive strategies. China's development of an amphibious fleet, reflects Beijing's understanding that any operation against Taiwan requires projecting power across the strait. 

The Quad as a Model 

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, demonstrates how network-based cooperation can provide strategic value without the political liabilities of containment rhetoric. The Quad emerged not from formal treaties but from converging interests among four democracies concerned about maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Critically, the Quad has deliberately avoided characterising itself as a military alliance, precisely because such framing would alienate regional partners and validate Chinese claims of encirclement. Instead, it emphasises cooperation across a variety of domains such as maritime security, climate change, public health, and international development. This flexible, issue-focused model mitigates the political costs that formal alliance structures would incur. By allowing members to selectively engage on specific challenges rather than committing to comprehensive mutual defence obligations, the Quad preserves strategic autonomy while stillenabling meaningful coordination. Members can pursue cooperation where interests genuinely converge without triggering the domestic political backlash or regional suspicion that a formal anti-China military pact would generate. This approach also provides plausible deniability against Chinese accusations of encirclement, as cooperation on pandemic response or climate resilience appears less threatening than explicit military coordination, even when the underlying strategic logic remains deterrence focused. 

India's participation particularly illustrates the network model's advantages. New Delhi maintains strategic autonomy as a core principle of its foreign policy and would refuse to join a formal anti-China alliance, yet it participates actively because the Quad respects Indian agency. The grouping also creates overlapping bilateral connections with Australia and Japan that strengthen regional relative to the preceding hub and spoke model. 

Building a Modern Alliance Network 

Moving beyond Cold War rhetoric requires articulating what an alliance network actually looks like. A functional Indo-Pacific Alliance Network would operate on three key principles. First, variable partnership levels. Japan and Australia maintain comprehensive defence partnerships with full interoperability. The Philippines and Vietnam focus on specific capabilities like maritime domain awareness and coast guard cooperation. Indonesia and Pacific Island states engage through economic connectivity and capacity building, with no alignment requirement. Partners' autonomy and constraints are respected through their level of engagement. Secondly, the network should coordinate broad challenges, not just with regard to geographical containment. A technology coalition secures semiconductor supply chains. A maritime security network combats illegal fishing and offshore drilling. A humanitarian assistance framework pools disaster response capacity. Partners engage where interests align, without insurmountable pressure to participate everywhere. Finally, the network must provide permanent mechanisms without permanent alignment. For example, an Indo-Pacific security forum that would allow officials to receive consultation. Joint exercises that practice realistic scenarios such as public health crises, maritime incidents, or disaster relief, rather than just demonstrating military might. These would build trust through practical cooperation whilst allowing independent foreign policies. Engagement must be genuine. Partners must see their concerns shaping American strategy, not simply facilitating it. 

The June 2025 carrier transit demonstrated that China can no longer be completely geographically contained. But this does not mean forward US military presence has become irrelevant. American presence remains essential to deter a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan and prevent Beijing from using military coercion to reshape regional order. The amphibious capabilities that both sides are developing underscore that geography will remain militarily significant. However, maintaining credible forward presence requires partners who willingly enable American access, not partners who are coerced into allowing access. The Quad demonstrates that network-based cooperation can provide strategic value without Cold War rhetoric. By shifting to a modern Indo-Pacific alliance network that respects partner agency while still advancing shared interests, Washington can strengthen the relationships on which its strategy depends. Geography still matters; islands still provide strategic value, and forward presence remains essential. But the framework for understanding these realities must evolve beyond concepts that increasingly alienate the very partners America needs most. The Cold War ended more than three decades ago. American strategic rhetoric needs to catch up to reality. 

Written by Eli James Bednarek

Edited by Janaki Kapadia