Liberté, Égalité, Sécurité: Europe’s Sovereignty Depends on French German Cooperation

Source: Flickr. Credit - Martin Schulz. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

The erosion of the transatlantic world order has been evident since Donald Trump's hegemonic claims on Greenland. Over 80 years after the end of the Second World War, Europe stands at a historic turning point, with seemingly permanent alliances facing a new era. While this places a massive strain on transatlantic relations, it may also present an opportunity for the European Union – maybe the last.

Even among staunch Trans-Atlanticists, many never imagined that 'the West' could exist in any meaningful sense in the absence of the United States. However, an American president who conducts international politics as a transactional power game is making a divided ‘West’ a bitter reality. Since the start of Trump’s second term, the global landscape has undergone a marked shift, with the world becoming increasingly divided into three spheres of influence: Washington, Beijing and Moscow (Nelson 2025). In Trump’s geopolitical landscape, Brussels no longer plays a role.

Europeans have relied on American security guarantees for decades, something they have only recently acknowledged. From an economic perspective, Europe's reliance on international security has resulted in a classic moral hazard scenario: the credibility of safety guarantees from the United States has diminished the motivation to develop its own effective defence capabilities. The decision might have been  politically convenient, but it has led to a risky path dependency.

The concept of credible deterrence is not only applicable to military strategy but also to economic policy. Uncertainty surrounding Europe's security guarantees significantly affects the opacity of the long-term financial implications of political decisions. This has ramifications for a wide range of economic factors, from defence spending to capital flows. Geopolitical uncertainty has been shown to lead to higher risk premiums in investments, capital markets and industrial value creation (Caldara and Iacoviello 2022). In open economies, therefore, security dependence influences not only foreign policy but also the attractiveness of the location for businesses. If Europe is to prevent being overshadowed by other major powers, the present moment necessitates the accelerated progression of European integration.

France is going to, undoubtedly, play a pertinent role in driving European integration forward. During his 2017 address at the Sorbonne University, French President Emmanuel Macron cautioned that Europe had become dangerously dependent on foreign powers. He aptly remarked that "carelessness, weakness and blindness have characterised Europe" (Macron 2017). He presciently recognised that the only means of safeguarding Europe's sovereignty and ensuring its survival in the contemporary global environment was through Europe building its own defence capabilities. This determination to confront uncomfortable realities and the unwavering conviction that a robust, unified Europe, particularly regarding security policy, is yet to be adopted across the border, in Germany. It is imperative that Germany seize the opportunity to establish a genuine European security and defence union while a staunch pro-European occupies the Élysée Palace. This stance is part of the long-standing Franco-German responsibility of leading Europe. From reconciliation after the Second World War to the Élysée Treaty and the Euro Crisis, whenever Europe has faced existential challenges, Germany and France have led the way together.

The prevailing geopolitical dynamics, therefore, necessitate a renewed collaborative leadership framework within the EU. A praiseworthy exemplar includes German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s endeavour to cultivate more robust German-Italian relations (Bundesregierung/Governo Italiano, 2026). However, it remains unclear why it would be in Europe’s interests to oppose the French reform proposals. The establishment of an effective security structure within the EU is contingent upon a shared nuclear power. Germany and a considerable number of other member states of the EU currently depend on the United States for nuclear deterrence. Germany itself is prohibited by the “two-plus-four treaty”, established after the Second World War, from developing and possessing its own nuclear weapons. French involvement is, therefore, imperative. Given that France already maintains a credible nuclear deterrent and has recently announced plans to expand its arsenal (Macron, 2026), the development of nuclear weapons programmes by additional EU member states would not be required. Such programmes would entail substantial financial costs while providing only limited additional benefits to Europe’s overall credible deterrence.

However, several approaches to accelerate European integration towards the establishment of a unified defence union have frequently been undermined by individual member states. A notable example of this is Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orbán (Müller & Slominski, 2025). It is imperative that Europe does not permit itself to be diverted by Hungary and other Eurosceptics’ endeavours to disrupt European integration. To circumvent the potential for the EU’s security policy to become ineffectual due to the principle of unanimity, it is imperative that Macron, Meloni and Merz take the initiative in establishing a defence alliance comprised of nations with congruent outlooks, forming a ‘coalition of the willing’. The path forward is unambiguous: any individual prepared to take responsibility for preserving European sovereignty is encouraged to participate. However, those who prioritise national politics over common security will not be permitted to continue paralysing Europe's ability to act.

Furthermore, Mario Draghi’s famous words, “whatever it takes” (Draghi, 2012), should become the guiding principle of a security policy shift in Europe, primarily led by France and Germany. From a regulatory perspective, the justification for joint European investments is contingent upon them being superior to unilateral national measures. The primary source of political and economic synergies is the establishment of a unified European nuclear umbrella. Europe should articulate a cohesive, unified stance and collectively fortify its defence, lest it forfeits its influential position.

At the 2020 Munich Security Conference (Macron, 2020), Macron proposed the initiation of negotiations between France and the German government on the establishment of a European protective shield. However, Angela Merkel's government did not respond to this offer, arguably constituting a significant foreign policy error. However, recent events indicate a historical turnaround: During Macron’s speech at Ils Longue, Germany and France announced increased cooperation on nuclear deterrence through the creation of a high-level bilateral steering group for doctrinal dialogue and strategic coordination, including the German participation in French nuclear exercises (Federal Government of Germany, 2026). The initiative will further be embedded in a broader European deterrence architecture and has already attracted the interest of several other member states of the European Union. In light of these developments, it is imperative that the German government remains fully engaged with France’s initiative and also pushes the negotiations on a joint nuclear umbrella forward.

For nuclear deterrence to be credible, it must be embedded in a comprehensive European defence architecture. However, it cannot replace general European military capabilities. Therefore, a European security and defence union must inevitably have conventional capabilities and common structures – in other words, a European army. The nuclear umbrella merely provides ultimate reassurance. The fact that Europe’s defence capabilities have so far been organised primarily at national levels is less about politics than it is a status quo bias and a failure of coordination (Wolff et al, 2025). 27 parallel procurement and planning processes prevent economies of scale, increase unit costs and tie up resources inefficiently. A European approach would be much more efficient. Joint armament procurement, coordinated training, and the development of complementary military capabilities would allow resources to be pooled sensibly, avoiding the duplication of structures. For example, why is there not just one collective EU air force when fighter jets can cross national borders in seconds? Anyone who believes that one country in Europe can defend itself alone is misjudging reality. European defence capability in an increasingly divided ‘West’ can only exist collectively — or not at all.

Many will argue that establishing such a security policy architecture in such a short time is unthinkable. Just as unthinkable as an American President questioning Europe's sovereignty. The prevailing paradigm of long-term gradual change has been overtaken by new political realities. Surveys indicating considerable support for a legitimate European defence union illustrate that the European public has progressed beyond the expectations of certain politicians, who, driven by a fear of losing their positions of authority, assert the impracticability of such a venture. With Germany spending hundreds of billions of Euros on defence capabilities, there is a renewed incentive to solve failures of coordination and align investments with France, Italy and all European partners willing to join. The notion of Europe being shaped by external forces is a fallacy. Europe is, and should always be regarded as, a product of its own citizens.

About the authors:

Anna Neumann studied Politics, Philosophy, and Economics at Witten/Herdecke University. In her master’s thesis, she examined the circumstances under which actors are willing to engage in nuclear disarmament. Today, she spends her free time promoting liberalism and a strong EU.

Carlo Knapp studied Economics at the London School of Economics and is currently pursuing his PhD at the Bonn Graduate School of Economics. On carloknapp.com you can find some of his academic work.

Edited by Aditya Gupta